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(submitted by  the;-Coriunissiorrto  the -Council) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  855/84 of  31  Ma~~h 1984  on.  the  calculation 
and  the dismantlement of  the monetary compensatory amounts  applying  to 
certain agricultural  products  (OJ  No  .L  90,  1.4.1984,  p.l.) introduced 
into  the agri-monetary system a  system of calculation of  the  MCAs 
known  as  "switch over" or "green  ECU'~.  ·The  relevant  provisions are 
now  in Article  6  of Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  16 77/85  of  11  June 
1985  on  the monetary  compensatory .amounts  in the agricultural sector 
(OJ  No  L  164,  24.6.1985,  p.6.) which,  as  the  consolidated version of 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  974/81'  (OJ  No  L  106;  i2.5.1971,  p.l.),  replaced 
the  latter with effect as at 1.1.1986. 
2.  Article 6(4)  of  this  Regulation  iays  dow that  the  Commission  must 
submit  to  the Council  before  31  December  1986  a  report  on  the 
application of  the  switch-:O"fer  system •.... 
On  the basis  of  this  report,  the  Commission  must  make  proposals  in the 
light of  the economic  and monetary situation of  the Community, 
developments  with regard  to  farm  incomes  and experience gained,  and 
the  Council  is  to adopt,  before  the beginning of  the  1987/88 milk 
marketing year,  decisions designed either to extend  the  current  system 
or establish another system.  Should-the Council  not'  comply  with  this 
obligation,  the  system of  calculation of  the  MCAs  applicable before 
the  1984/85  marketing year  (the  "conventional  system")  will  re-enter 
into force. 
3.  By  submitting  this document',-the  Commission  is complying  with  this 
clause.  In view of  the  factors  to  be  referred  to during  the 
preparation of  its proposals,  it has  felt  that it should  go  beyond  the 
framework  set for  the  report by  the  relevant Article,  and  submit  a 
general  review of  the agri-monetary situation as it now  appears. 
II.  THE  BASES  OF  THE  SYSTEM 
4.  The  agri-monetary system;has  no~ been  oper~ting for·ls years  in a  form 
which  has  essentially not  been  changed  as  to  the essential,  despite 
the  many  detailed adjustments  •. - 2  -
The  fundamental  ideas  have  remained  the same: 
the prices and  other amounts  fixed under  the  CAP  are expressed in an 
agricultural unit of account;  to be  implemented,  the amounts 
determined  in this way  are  to  be  converted  into national currencies 
by  the  Member  States,  no~lly using conversion rates  reflecting 
real monetary conditions; 
- the  market  organizations,  especially where  they have  rigid 
intervention arrangements  with direct  impact  on  the market,  cannot 
always  bear,  immediately,  the effects - reductions or increases  in 
the  prices as expressed  in national currency - of  changes  in 
exchange rates,  especially where  the  scale of  the  change  is  large or 
where  there are  frequent  changes  (floating);  the need  for  some 
degree  of _price  stability is too  strong; 
the  principle of stable prices  can be  safeguarded only by  the 
application of stable and  specific agricultural  conversion rates 
which  may  deviate  - because of  their stability - from  real  economic 
circumstances  (creation of  green rates); 
use of  special green rates entails different price  levels for  the 
various Member  States;  these  price differences,  unless very small, 
require offsetting in trade - the monetary  compensatory amounts 
(MCAs).  For oilseeds,  there  is  the  system of  "differential 
amounts"; ·these are  MCAs  adapted  to a  deficiency payment  system. 
III.  CURRENT  PROBLEMS 
5.  Originally devised for  a  limited  period  (cf.  Article  8  of Regulation 
(EEC)  No  974/71),  the  system of  monetary compensation has  since become 
an essential aspect of  the  CAP  in its own  right.  However,  it was  set 
up  in economic  circumstances very different from  the  present  ones.  At 
the  time  (1971),  there was  general  currency instability (floating) and 
firm support of agricultural prices  through  the  system of  intervention 
under market  organizations. 
The  economic  environment  has  since  undergone  a  good  deal  of  change. 
The  European Monetary  System  (EMS)  has  restored some  degree of 
exchange-rate stability for  most  of  the Community's  currencies.  The 
problem of  the agricultural surpluses  has necessitated more  flexible 
intervention rules.  Nonetheless,  green rates diverging according  to 
Member  State and  product  have  become  the rule and  represent an 
important  factor  in  the annual  price  reviews. 6.  The  MCAs  arid  their  di~~Jl'tiem~iit._ihS:ve.''  fi~~o!De·)i~permanent-'problem  •. 
From  the outset,  they  wei;e:·see~.-~$  acn~cessa~y,-~V.iL  They are ,an evil 
because  they are an obstac'le.to  trad~; 'they_ are·,·· rio~etheless, 
necessary because  of  the  .·existE¥~e:·:of·.pt:"ice·-~g~raiitee mechanisms  and 
offsetting of differing price' levers;:··  -~ .. ·.',_  ·.-..  - . 
.  1·  ·_,  -~  :" • • _.,  ....  ~ . .., . .  '  ••  ::.  :·  ,s: ...  ·.::··- <l'-
:.:  --~  ·  ...  .  ·.  ,, .. ,  _· ...  :-.:::::, ..  '  ..... ·  --·-.::..-:  ., 
•  •  •  •  _~.  '  •  •  • _.,. :~  ""\.;. :.  :;""!~-~  •  - •  ,; •• _  ..  __  :  •  •  •  •  •  •  ..  - •• 
In fact,  the  problem derives'~-nck. from't.he-. introduction of  the MCAs, 
but  from  the existence of  guarantee mechanisms  and  from  the disparity 
of  prices  t  of which  t;he  green .rates are;.only an  expression and  the 
MCAs  the  consequence·:· ;;;Th'i~·- dispar1iyd.ts'et{.::·i.s\d~e j:.o  the  fact  that 
it is politically  impo~sibl~ to  elicit''·ac~~ptan'~e of' 'the principle 
that in  all circumstances' li change: in the value  of  a  currency must 
have  an  immediate  impact  on  the prices of.agricultural  products,  as it 
will normally have  on  the  prices .,of  manufactures.  That  such 
acceptance is impossible ·has~ lfeen·ascertained mainly  among  the  Member 
States having  positive MCAs:  the  eliminatic;>n of • such  MCAs  must 
necessarily force  doWn  farmgate  prices because  the green  rate would  be  .  ~  \- '  .  . 
revalued. 
~·  ~-·  :-.:.  ::  '~-~  . 
~ .  . 
For  this  reason,  since.' i984·; ·the· way·· in which. the  MCAs  are calculated 
has  been based on  the  strongest-'curret1CY and  has  meant  that currency 
realignments affect only  the .riegative,_MCAs.  ·· 
.  .  ._  .....  ·.  :..,...: ....  ~-::~>-··::i:-:, .  .,....- -'!·:·;::. ...  _<  ..,.t·:  :-- :  ·.~  ........  ··,~·  ·~·;~·<·~"  ..  :~  .. ;,..<  ....... ·.  ··~...  .  . 
The  dismantlement  of  the 'riegatiVe 'MCAs  ~  which~·--fn  1984,  was. felt  to be 
an easier proposition since it would entail increases  in prices 
expressed  in national. currency' . has 'been'· to  some  extent  hampered 
insofar as  the  Community,  which  has  a  problem of  moUJ}ting  surpluses  to 
contend with,  must  bear  in mind  the  danger of.the added  incentive  to 
output which any  price· increase must  e(ltail.  ...  Insofar as  the  negative 
MCAs  increase,  the  pressure  for :their elilnination and  for  an  increase 
in prices  has  grown  stronger~ 
This  problem was  understood  in  1984·.  For  this  reason,  after an 
experimental  period,  the  choice  must  now  be  made  again between  the 
systems,· bet\\(een :positive.,and  neg~tiye;.:.~C~~_,,,,~having ·due_regard  to  the 
inc'reases or. reduc  tio~'8'  ':(~ "p'r-ic'es'  _:  e~p~-~~·~~(1'' ifi'" riatio~al . currency which 
their respective dismantlement. leads  to·.  ·  ·· 
In  the  system in force  since  1984,  another  choice  had  to  be  made,  that 
between  the  maintenance  of  the  level of  prices  and  MCAs,  on  the  one 
hand,  or  the abolition of  these  amounts  and  an  increase  in prices  on 
the  other.  In view of  the  situation \iith regard  to  production and 
· profitability of· farming 'in the· various ·Member  States,  this choice  led 
to  the establishment of  green rates differing by  product within 
individual  Member  S~'i.t~,s~:t:.<~;~:_.,:;~;;:;:;  .. r ;':r-<::~:·:~ 7;,:-,}~--- ..  '-..:-:'.  ,  . 
7.  The  situation was  complicated by  the considerable depreciation in 
sterling and  the  drachma, _which  in the' recent  past has  left monetary 
gaps  exceeding  20  and  30_percentage:points respectively.  These  gaps - 4  -
have not  only caused very high  [!o1CAs  but also difficulties in trade  in 
certa.in items  for  which  there are no  MCAs.  Such difficulties, 
according  to sector, are different depending  on  whether  they  concern 
trade between  the  Member  States or trade .with non-member  countries or, 
indeed,  both  together. 
8.  Also,  operation of  the  monetary  compensatory  system over  a  relatively 
long  period has  revealed problems  of detail which,  in a  short-term, 
blanket approach,  could be  accepted but  which  require adaptations  for 
a  mechanism  which  is  to be  maintained. 
9.  The  solutions  sought  for  the various  factors  mentioned  above  entail 
divergent  and  sometimes  conflicting approaches,  which  have  influenced 
the decisions  taken. 
This situation is largely a  result of  the fact  that a  monetary 
phenomenon  foreign  to  the agricultural  system  is superposed  on  the 
system of  guaranteed agricultural prices.  The  decisions  concerning 
exchange  rates originate in the diverging  trends of  the economies,  and 
as  a  result,  of  the Member  States'  currencies.  For  as  long as 
convergent  economic  policies of  the Member  States have  not  been 
achieved,  currency  realignments will  continue. 
The  agri-monetary  problem is  thus  a  reflection of  th~ Community's 
economic  and  monetary situation.  In  the absence of a  common  economic 
and monetary  policy  the  expression of which. would  be  a  Community 
currency, 'problems will arise. 
However,  these  can be  solved  through different approaches.  In its 
White  Paper~  the Commission,  with a  view  to  progressive strengthening 
o·f  the  convergence of  the  f-iember  States'  economies,  came  out 
(point  38)  in favour  of  the abolition of  the  system of  MCAs  in  1992  by 
automatic  alignment  of  the agricultural prices where  there was  a 
currency  realignment.  In  the  immediate  future,  this approach does  not 
seem  feasible.  Nonetheless,  the  present  system can always  be 
improved,  in particular with a  view  to  the  1992  deadline.  This  is the 
viewpoint  from  which  this  report has been drafted.  It covers  not  only 
experience  gained with  the  "switch-over" system but  provides  an 
opportunity  to  conduct·a general. policy review with regard  to  future 
guidelines.  This  review should  not  ignore  progress already made  in 
the  convergence  of  the  economic  policies  on  the  one  hand,  and 9  on  the 
other hand,  the  need  to adapt certain Community  systems  in order  to 
achieve control of  the  problem of  the agricultural surpluses,  and  the 
need  to  strengthen  the  economic  and  social  cohesion of  the  Community, 
as  advocated by  the  Single Act. IV •.  THE  MONETARY  COMPENSATION  SYSTEMS; IN.'AGRICULTURE-:~. 
.  .  .  - ..... ·. '  ,.  ~ •. 
10.  The _prices  and  other  ~6u:n:ts-· fi~ed  ~nder,..'the. conunon  agricultural 
policy have· always  beeJ}--~xpresse~,.·fri-~!i}l'agriculturc1(:un.i,t:of ·• 
account.  This  therefore  ha~·to·beqeffned and  rules  relating  to 
its conversion  into_ tl:le:_pa~io,nal.<:,ctu;:r,ep.<;:Jes  of  t~h~  M~rilber States 
had  to  be  agreed·;  .. ,  t!1is'::·'wa8:.;::<ib'iie.~in'~;.I96.f:'b}·-·Regulat'ion· No~::l'29· (OJ -
No  L  106,  30.10.1962,  p.  ZS53/6-2)~-~..-:Aciditional :rules w'ere  adopted 
in 1968  (Regulation  (EEC)  No  653/68,  OJ  No  L  123~  31.5.19~8, p.  4, 
and  Regulation  (EEC)  No-'1134/68,  O.J-~o L  188,  1.8.1968,  p.  1.; 
these  three Regulations  ..  w_ere-~r~pealed-.b{.RegulatiC)n  (EEC) 
No  1676/85),  which were-based  cjn''th.e  idea~that any  currency 
realignment  should  lead  to-inunediate-adaptation  in the national 
currencies of  the  prices.and_other~amowits expressed inunits of 
account,  so  as  to  restore· eqtiilibrJuni,;.be_tweeti  price .levels_ in the 
various  Member  States.·",,·:  .-,_,r.-::·:·:;-c'~::.~-~-c;:r ..  :~:;>:·- ~  :- .- .. - ·  .·-
•  •'  r 
But it became  clear~·during-t'he period of exchange-rate strain in 
1969,  that  this ·rigidity in-the  system:was not-in line· with  the 
Member  States'  economic  needs:  both:increases and  reductions  in 
prices  when  expressed _in_ national .c~rr·ency as  a  result of  . 
exchange-rate  changes  couid,  either b'ecaiise of :their impact  on. 
farm  incomes  or because of 'their impact  on  infladon,  cause major 
political difficulties.  tn  the  circlimstances,- exceptions  to  the 
arrangements  in force at  the  time  had  to  be  made.  Intended as 
temporary,  they  have  become  pe,rmanent • 
..  ~ ... ~'  .~ ..  ~. 
The  underlying  reason-for  this  change. lies in the  fact  that 
exchange-rate  changes  haveeffects-on agriculture which are very 
different  from  those  :in  other-sectors of  the  economy~  In  the 
other industries,  the  impact  of  a  currency  realignment  lies 
essentially in changes  in the  prices  of  imported  inputs.  As  there 
·are no  ~'institutionalized!,:~;prices.:'9-;\the•market\price .for.:a. product 
is  the  reflection in economi'c'reafity  ~f~·th~; 'effect  of'  t'lie  ' 
currency readjustments,  normally' to  the extent by which it is 
influenced  by  the  new prices  of  import~d inputs after the 
realignment.  Consequently,  market  prices reflect neither fully 
nor  inunediately  the  consequences  oY  the  currency realignment,  and 
in any  case  these  consequences  tend  to  fade  over  time.  ·The 
opposite applies  for agriculture.  ·The  guaranteed prices,  which 
influence  and  guide  the  market  prices, arenormally- without 
green  rates  :_  inunediately- affected;.~.and/for ~the  ::en~irety of  the 
impact  of  the  currency  realignment.  But  in fact  this  impact  is 
largely theoretical;  without.  tqe  marke-t., organization system, it 
would  never  be  wholly' reflect~d ;in':mafke·t. prices •. :' . - 6  -
Hence  the desire  to  cushion the  impact  and  to defer it by  the 
creation of  green rates.  However,  this is an approach which does 
not  solve  the  problem but merely defers it, and  the  monetary  "gap" 
thus  created persists at a  time when  market  developments  should 
already have  eliminated it.  As  a  result,  the  problem is, if 
anything,  made  more  serious and  entails a  need  to find  rules  for 
dismantling  the monetary·gaps  which  have built up.  The  approach, 
as  to principle,  was  and  remains  the adaptation of  the  green 
rates.  However,  because of  the impact  on  prices,  the  present 
procedures  for calculating  the  MCAs  have  been devised  in such a 
way  that their dismantlement  through  the adaptation of  the green 
rates is easier than it once  was. 
2.  The  present arrangements 
11.  The  provisions  in force  for  the  calculation of  the  MCAs  and  of 
the differential amounts  comprise  the  "conventional" system -
which  does  not apply for  the  time  being - and  the  "green ECU" 
system,  which  is now  being operated for a  period  running out 
at the end  of  the  1986/87 marketing year. 
Both  systems  have  the  same  price differences as  between  the 
Member  States,  due  to  the green rates.  According  to  products, 
the  price gaps  between  two  Member  States 
-either are not offset at all (this.is the case for  most 
agricultural  products  subject  to market  organization), 
or.  for  the  main  items,  are offset by  MCAs  (these covering, 
at  the  present  time,  cereals,  beef/veal,  pigmeat, 
poultrymeat,  milk,  sugar,  wine  and  "non-Annex  II" products), 
- or,  for oilseeds, are offset by  differential amounts. 
What  distinguishes  the  two  compensation  systems  (MCAs  and 
differential amounts)  is  the fact  that  the  MCAs  apply in  trade 
and  the differential amounts  to  the  payment  of  the  premium  due 
on  the  crushing of  seed or on export.  Fundamentally,  the  two 
systems are  largely comparable,  having a  part calculated on 
the  price and  a  coefficient affecting  the  levy  "premium"  (the 
premium  is,  in a  deficiency  payment  system,  the  equivalent of 
the  levy)  and  the  export  refunds.  Because of  this similarity, 
in  the  present  report  the  two  systems  are  regarded as 
equivalent  and  the  same  approach is used  for  both. ~ 7 
The  bases  of  calcuiat"lon  :~fat _::tti~-)tcAs:~~~d :the -.differential . 
amounts  have  alw~y~ been  identl.cal  ~  ··:TI1~Fare_: · 
·"  ··,  .. :·  -::-. 
- the monetary gap;  and 
. >· 
- the  institutional  -p~[;~. ,-~ 
The  (agri-) mone·tary  component~ properly s·o  called,  is  the 
"monetary  gap".  It normally  ___ expresses  the difference  between 
the  green . rate and. the :re~t  ··value'· c?f.::~l/~~rrency_"  ~xpressed in 
agricultural units of  acCO\lnt .-· 
12.  Before  considering in more  detail  how  this:approach has  been 
implemented  in the green  ECU  system~- it may  be  useful  to 
consider briefly the  conventional  system  (defined  in Article  5 
of Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85)~ whichis,  in the  presentation 
of  the  provisions  now ,in force, .still the .main  and basic 
system.  ·  .,:··  · · Y-·:<·-.,  .. ·':  ; .,_.,;;.~-:::--. · · ·  ........  · 
.  .  . 
The  provisions define  th'e  monetary ·gap :as- the difference, 
expressed as  a  percentage,. between  the  green rate  (fixed  in 
the annexes  to Regulation  (EEC)  No.l677/85)  and  the  real value 
of  a  currency expressed  in agricultural units  of  account, 
which  is normally  the  ECU  (Article  1  of  Regulation  (EEC) 
No  1676/85).  But,  to  determine  this  real value,  Article  5  of 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  ·1677/85  does  not  use  the rate fixed  on a 
day-to-day basis by  reference  to  quotations  on  the  exchanges, 
for  each of  the  Community  _currencies,  in  terms  of  the  ECU,  but 
uses 
- for  the  currencies  comp1yiu'g  with. the'  na~row fluctuation 
margin,  the  central rates,.  ~nd  __ 
- for each of  the other Community  currencies,  an average  of 
the  rates  recorded  on  the exchanges  expressed  in  the 
currencies  complyini~:  -w~tb.:i:  the";ri~rto~:f.,q\.tctuatio?. rna:rg~n. 
.  .  .  ..  .  .  ;·  . .  :  ~  .  .  .. ·'..  .  ~  }  . 
One  of  the  reasons  for. _this  choice was,  it is true,  the 
historical development  of_the calculation rules,  but it was 
also dictated in part by  the  need  to  have  a  relatively stable 
basis  of  reference.  This  is represented by  the  central  rates 
of  the  currencies of  the  Member  States  compl'yi.~g with a  narrow 
margin  of  fluctuation.  The _logic  of. Ute  system requires  a 
single  reference basis;  and·it-th~re·fore see·ms._appropriate  to 
use  this basis  in all cases.  · - 8  -
This  short  review of  the conventional  system shows  that  the 
calculation of  the  MCAs  is not  in fact based on  the  ECU  but on 
a  value which  is close  to it (and which,  for simplicity's 
sake,  will  nonetheless  be  called  the "real  ECU").  It is 
important  to note  that this value  represents  the agricultural 
unit of  account:  since  the green rates are fixed  in  terms  of 
the agricultural unit of account  (whatever its denomination), 
the real value with which  they are compared  can only be  that 
of'the agricultural unit of account.  Thus  it is  the  method  of 
calculation of  the  MCAs  which  in fact determines  the value of 
the agricultural unit of account.  The  latter has  been  changed 
on  several occasions  since  1971:  originally,  MCAs  were 
calculated with reference  to  the dollar;  in 1973  the dollar 
gave  way  to an average of  the  central rates of  the currencies 
of  the Member  States in the  "snake";  this average,  in its turn 
was  superseded  in 1979  by  that of  the central rates  of  the 
currencies  in the  ECU  complying with  the narrow fluctuation 
margin. 
Since,  by  definition,  there  can only be  a  single unit of 
account  for agriculture,  the method  of calculation of  the  MCAs 
has  repercussions  on all of  the  CAP,  even  for  the  products not 
subject  to  the  MCAs  and  for markets  for  which  there is no  EEC 
organization. 
13.  The  present  system of calculation of  the  MCAs  is  defined  in 
Article  6  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85.  Since  the 
agricultural unit of account  is determined  by  the  manner  of 
calculating the MCAs,  the  green  ECU  system is nothing other 
than a  new  definition of  this unit of account;  instead of  the 
ECU  - or of  the central rates which  take its place - a  "green 
ECU"  is used  which  corresponds  to  the "real ECU"  (in the sense 
defined at point  12) multiplied by  a  "correcting  factor". 
This factor  may  be  interpreted as an expression of  the  gap 
which  separates  the real  ECU  from  the  "green ECU". 
This  system is described  in detail in an  annex,  from  the 
angles  of  its implementation,-its practical application and 
the way  it has  developed. 
At  a  strictly technical  level, experience  gained  in  the  use  of 
the  green  ECU  system has  not  revealed weaknesses;  the  system 
is  just as  valid as  any  other.  However,  it is not really 
transparent.  The  conventional  system of  calculation was 
already somewhat  difficult to  grasp;  the  system now  in force 
has  involved a  further degree of  complication  through  the 
creation of  the-green  ECU. - 9 -. 
14.  As  regards  economic  conseqtienc~s,  the foll_owl.ng  differences as 
compared  with the  preceding  system a·r:e  to -be _noted. 
'.· .......  .. 
.  ,  •'"  ·- ~.- ......... . 
As  the  green  ECU  'system  d~~s ~dt ·affect- t-he-.g~~e·ri-- rates,  the 
levels of national  prices riorinally.remain unchanged.- However, 
the  gaps  between  the  price levels of- two  Member  State~; are 
distributed differently,  sine·~ new -positive MCAs  are  no_  longer 
created,  a  currency-realignment entailing the creationonly of 
negative  MCAs.  In other words:  the  sum  of  the  MCAs  applied in 
trade between  two  H~mber: States:· is  the~satrii:!' in--the-
conventional  system and  thepresent:system;  however,  the 
latter is intended  to  reduce  the  share of  the  positive MCAs  to 
zero. 
-...  - ~  ...  . 
When  this stage is reached, .the  way  the  "neutral margins" 
operate will be  modified:  these are  add~d to each other when 
positive and  negative  MCAs  apply_at  the_same  time.  Assuming 
that  there are only 'negative  MCAs  ~·the impact· of 'the neutral 
ma.rgins  is: 
- reduced  to  1.5  in  trade··between a  negative  MCA  Member  State 
and  a  Member  State without  MCAs,  _ 
- neutralized  in trade  between  two  negative  MCA  Member  States 
(which is also  the  case  under  the  convetitional  system). 
This  consequence  has  not so  far been·achieved  •. 
15.  The  main  point  on  which  the  two  systems  diverge  is  the  level 
of  the  common  price  they  lead  to.  Total  dismantlement  of  the 
MCAs  by  the adaptation of  the green rates  leads: 
:  · - -- ;,~;~~~~;-~f-;-~~ii~~:-S1',~t~:~;r.:~~~~~\"Z;~t!t~1~'~t!r~~1i~,,-~:.t~:;~i~:.,~d;r·'"~';;i"'--~--;>  :. 
-in the  conventional  system,  to a'price level  determined by 
the counter-value of  the  real  ECU  in the  currency of  the 
Member  States, 
- in  the  green  ECU  system,  to a  price level  determined by  the 
counter value of  the  green  ECU  in  the  curr~ncy of  the Member 
States.  But  the  green  ECU  represents  a  price  level higher 
than that of  the  real  ECU.  _:  . ,  .. _ - 10  -
In both hypotheses,  since  the MCAs  will.have have  been 
dismantled,  the price level  reached will be a.single one 
throughout  the  Community  - this will  thus be a  reversion to 
the  "common  price" - but  the  level will be  higher on  an 
alignment  on  the green ECU.  This  has  led  some  observers  to 
assert that  the green ECU  system is inflationary by 
definition, at any  time,  because  the change  in the correcting 
factor is an automatic and  immediate  consequence,  the 
subsequent adaptation of  the green rates expressing in 
national currency,  completely clearly, only an event  that has 
already occurred in a  concealed way  when  the  correcting factor 
was  increased. 
There  is no  denying  that  through  the application of  a 
correcting factor,  the value in which  the  common  price and  the 
other amounts  fixed  under  the  CAP  are expressed is increased. 
However,  any  unduly hasty conclusion should be avoided:  under 
the  preceding  system,  the calculation of  the  MCAs  followed  the 
conventional method  and  the  positive MCAs  were  dismantled in 
compliance with the  1979  gentleman's  agreement.  But 
experience shows  that under  this system positive MCAs  could be 
demobilized only if the  reduction in prices expressed in 
national currencies which  would  have  resulted from  the 
revaluation of  the  green rates of  the  currencies  concerned was 
offset by  an at least equivalent increase in the prices  in 
ECU.  As  the price level set in ECU  is the  same  throughout  the 
Community,  this  system therefore also entails an increase in 
the  common  prices at least equal  to  that resulting from  the 
green  ECU  system if all the newly  created positive MCAs  are 
dismantled. 
16.  However,  the conventional  system does  not  involve any 
automatic  mechanism  such as  the alteration of  the  correcting 
factor.  The  increase  in  the  common  price is,  under  the 
conventional  system,  the result of  a  Council  decision adopted 
.on  the  basis,  and  in the  context of, a  set of political 
guidelines  given annually  through  the  price  review.  Under  the 
green  ECU  system,  this discretionary component  of a  political 
decision has  disappeared. 
However,  this  is only a  theoretical view of  the situation: 
while  the  increase in the  common  price is undeniable,  it has 
its effects only· through an alteration of  the  green rates. 
But  here  there is no  automatic mechanism.  The  decision is 
taken by  the  Council,  on  a  proposal  from  the Commission,  and 
the alterations in the green rates adopted during  the  period 
under  review show  that the authorities have  moved  cautiously. 
The  result has  been negative monetary gaps,  sometimes  very 
large, which  have  not been demobilized;  however,  the widest 
gaps  (Greece  and  the United Kingdom)  are not  due  to  the  green 
ECU  system but  to  the performances  of  the  relevant currencies. - 11  -
17.  The  budgetary aspects of  the  problem do  not  lead  to any other 
conclusion:  it is fair to  contend  that the green  ECU  system 
has not entailed heavier expenditure  than would  have  been 
entailed under  the conventional  system.  This  claim is based 
on a  hypothetical  comparison-made  by  supposing  that  the 
positive MCAs  created under  the  conventional  system would  have 
been dismantled on  their creation by  an alteration of  the 
green rates,  the effects of.this being offset by  a 
corresponding  increase in  the  level of  the  common  prices 
expressed in ECU,  which  has  been  the practice in the past. 
18.  A judgement  as  to  the maintenance or elimination of  the 
present system must,  however,  allow for new  facts:  the 
objective of  the  green  ECU  system - clearly expressed in the 
recitals of Regulation  (EEC)  No  855/84 - has  been  the 
conversion into negative MCAs  of  the positive monetary .gaps  in 
the expectation of  an easier dismantlement of  the negative 
MCAs  leading  to an  increase in prices expressed in national 
currencies. 
However,  the mounting  surpluses  in the  Community  and  the 
·difficulties hampering  their disposal,  combined with budgetary 
restraints, entail the greatest prudence  in th"ts  area;  the 
judgement  as  to easier .dismantlement of  the negative  MCAs  is 
based on  the supposition - which has not  really been clearly 
shown  - of  some  degree of monetary stability,  thus of a  · 
relatively modest  level of  MCAs.  The  recent  past shows  that 
this hypothesis  is not correct.  The  performance  of  the dollar 
has .implications for  the  EMS  currencies,  the end  result of 
which is more  frequent adaptations of  the  central rates of  the 
Community  currencies. 
The  inevitable consequence  under  the  present  system is a 
permanent  increase  in the negative  MCAs,  the  dismantlement  of 
which  becomes  more  and  more  uncertain: at Community  level, it 
runs  counter  to a  policy on  prices which  needs  to be 
relatively rigid, avoiding price  increases which  would 
underpin and  even stimulate  the  growth of  the surpluses.  This 
consequence  is to be  feared  from  an increase in the prices  in 
ECU,  or in national  currencies  following  the  dismantlement of 
the negative  MCAs  through changes  in the green rates.  The 
present  system of  calculation of  the MCAs  from  this angle, 
specifically in the present situation, entails an undeniable 
risk,  since it leads  to artificially high negative MCAs, 
higher in any  case  than inflation in the Member  States 
concerned  could  justify.  It is true that alteration of  the 
green rates is not automatic.  However,  in so far as  the 
negative  MCAs  increase and.are kept at a  high level over  long 
periods,  the need  for  their dismantlem(mt  increases. - 12  -
The  poiitical pressure along  these  lines is also 9  in  terms  of 
principles,  justified by  the need .to  ensure  in a  single market 
freedom  of  trade  and  freedom  from  distortions of  competition, 
which are requirements  which  are all the mare  difficult to 
comply  with the higher  the  MCAs. 
These  points  seem  to make  a  case for discontinuing  the present 
system and  reverting  to  the  conventional  system.  However,  the 
latter is closely tied up  with  the  "gentleman agreement" of 
1979,  which,  with a  view  to  the  dismantlement  of  the positive 
MCAs,  entails an  increase in  the  prices in ECU.  This  effect 
is  just as  unacceptable as  the unconditional  dismantlement of 
the negative  MCAs  under  the  present arrangement,  the  economic 
consequences  being  to all intents and  purposes  identical. 
This  means  that an arrangement  somewhere  between  the  two 
systems is needed.  It should entail maintenance  of  the 
present system  ("switch-over"),  while  avoiding an increase in 
prices  in national  currencies following  the dismantlement  of 
the negative MCAs. 
(c)  Conclusions  and  outlook 
19.  the  present system,  under which  farmers  in the Member  States 
with relatively less strong currencies bear  the burden,  where 
introduced,  of  the  MCAs  due  to  revaluations  of  other 
currencies,  can  therefore not be  retained in its present 
form.  The  solution to  be  adopted  should be  based  on  two 
considerations: 
- the  impact  of a  current  realignment on  the  market  tends  to 
work  itself out  over  time, 
- it stands  to  reason  that  following  a  currency realignment 
not only  the  consumers  but also  the  farmers  in  the Member 
States concerned  should bear  the  consequences. 
A more  "economic"  approach  therefore  leads  to  a  search for 
solutions which are more  equitable and which  also  tend  to 
dovetail agriculture more  closely into  the  general  economic 
environment.  This  is. an approach  in harmony  with  the  thinking 
which gives greater weight,  for  the  prices as well,  to  the 
laws  of  the market. 
Accordingly,  it would  be right: 
(a)  to maintain  the green  ECU  system; 
(b)  to  introduce  the  principle  that  the negative  MCAs 
resulting  from  a  "switch-over"  should be  dismantled  in two 
equal  stages, at  the  same  time  as  a  corresponding 
reduction in  these  prices in ECU  is carried out;  these 
measures  should be  taken by  the Commission  according  to 
the management  committee  procedure and  would  enter into 
force at  the  beginning of  the marketing years  following 
the  introduction of  the  relevant  MCAs;  . - 13  -
(c)  the specific green rate system should  be  abandoned,  with 
the compensation of  the  price difference entailed bt these 
rates,  from  1992/93 marketing year onwards.  From  that 
year,  the  real  ECU  should be effectively the agricultural 
unit of account  and  the green rates  should coincide with 
the central  rates of  Member  States'  currencies.  The 
abandonment  of  the  system is partly justified by 
developments  in  the  implementation of  the  Single  European 
Act,  and  in particular the  increased  convergence  of  the 
economies  of  the  Member  States  which  they will bring with 
them. 
3.  The  extension of  the  system  to  other sectors 
20.  The  decision concerning  the system of calculation of  the  MCAs  does 
not affect and  certainly does  not  solve  the agrimonetary  problems 
arising in very different contexts  and  which will be  considered  in 
more  detail below.  These  are  questions  relating  to: 
- the  extension of  the  system of monetary  compensation  to other 
sectors, 
- more  flexible  implementation of  the  system of  calculating  the 
monetary gap,  and 
- the  procedures  for calculation of  the  MCAs  for certain sectors. 
21.  Since  the  MCA  system restricts the  freedom  of  trade  between Member 
States,  its use  can be  contemplated  only when  it must  be  feared 
that without  such a  system  there would  be  disturbances  in trade 
(cf.  Article  3  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85). 
Developments  in  the  present situation (depreciation of  sterling 
and  the drachma)  have  shown  that while all monetary  compensation 
can be  dispensed with  in certain sectors having relatively 
flexible  intervention mechanisms,  problems  arise where  monetary 
gaps  are  too  wide. 
(a)  Ql!y~ oil 
The  market  situation has  not  been affected substantially in 
the  past since,  for  higher quality olive oils,  there  was,  in 
Greece,  an  export  ban,  infringing Community  law. 
In  the  1983/84 and  1984/85  marketing years,  Greek  exports  of 
olive oil  to  the other Member  States  (in particular Italy) and 
to  non-member  countries  increased and at  the  same  time  the 
quantities sent  to  intervention in  Italy also  increased. - 14  -
Normally,  Greek  production should be  disposed of  on  the 
Italian market,  which  is  the only deficit market  in the 
Community.  However,  because of  the  monetary  gap  for  the 
drachma  which  enables a  much  higher price  to  be  obtained in 
Italy,  the quantities offered may  be  so  large  that  Italian 
production  tends  to be  sent  to  intervention and  Spanish 
production,  because of  its price,  fails  to  find buyers. 
What  complicates  the  problem  is  the  fact  that deflection of 
trade  in commerce  with non-member  countries has  also been 
noted:  imports  have  been made  into Greece,  where  the  levy as 
expressed in national currency is the  lowest,  and,  in the 
absence of  monetary compensation,  the merchandise has  then 
been  re-exported for disposal  on  the market  of  another Member 
· State. 
A remedy  for all  these  problems  is the  introduction of  MCAs. 
Like  the  drachma,  sterling is now  also showing  wide  monetary 
gaps.  For agricultural products not attracting MCAs,  the 
scope  for exports  for British producers  has  therefore 
considerably  improved.  And  the  sheepmeat  market  in France has 
suffered accordingly;  ad  hoc  measures  taken have  served  to 
deal with the  problem for  the  time  being.  For other products, 
however,  the  same  difficulties are occurring.  This  is  the 
case,  for  example,  for  certain processed products  for  which 
the  processing costs  account  for  a  good  deal  of  the price. 
However,  where  the  monetary  gaps  for  the basic agricultural 
products  get  too  wide,  the  absence  of  MCAs  entails a  serious 
risk of  market  disturbance even  for  these highly  processed 
products. 
In  these  cases,  too,  MCAs  should be  introduced;  for certain 
products,  their application could be  confined  to 
intra-Community  trade,  if, in trade with non-member  countries, 
there is no  danger  of  market  disturbance because  of  the 
special situation of  the market. 
The  monetary  gap  for sterling is also causing difficulties for 
growers  of  peas  and  field beans  and  sweet  lupins  in other 
Member  States,  because British production can be  offered at 
prices  lower  than  those of  the other Member  States. - 15"-
The  basic  regulation for  these  products  (Regulation  (EEC) 
No  1431/82)  contains a  legal basis which allows of  the 
application of  a  system of monetary adjustment  for  the 
relevant  products.  The  system could be  set- up  now;  in view of 
the market  organization arrangements  in this sector,  the 
system could be  aligned on  that of  the differential amounts 
payable  for  oilseeds. 
In all the  cases mentioned  above,  it is, however,  important  to 
bear  in mind  that it has  been possible to avoid any  monetary 
compensation so  far without  major difficulties, as  long as  the 
monetary  gaps  have  not  got  too wide.  This  should mean  that 
relatively high "neutral margins"  can be  included in the 
calculation methods. 
4.  Alterations  to  be  made  to  the  present  system 
22.  This  conclusion  leads  on  to a  more  detailed examination of  the 
arrangement  for neutral margins. 
At  the  present  time,  the  MCA  neutral margins  are: 
- 1  point  for  the  positive MCAs, 
- 1.5 points  for  the negative MCAs, 
5  points  for  the  positive and negative  MCAs  for wine. 
The  aim  of  the neutral margins  is  to  reduce  the  impact  of  the 
MCAs,  in order  to  avoid  any over-compensation.  The 
calculation of  the exact economic  impact  of  the  currency 
variations  and  of  the neutral margins  is difficult, if not 
actually impossible.  This  is why  the  system as  a  whole  is 
devised on  a  flat-rate basis. 
Also,  in its present rigidity,  the neutral margins  system does 
not make  sufficient allowance  for  the specific features  of  the 
various markets  and  products. 
In fact,  distinctions must  be made  between  three categories of 
product: 
- basic  products  for which  there are rigid intervention 
arrangements, - 16  -
basic products  for which  there are weak  intervention 
~arrangements, 
- processed products. 
In a  rigid intervention system,  an  increase in the neutral 
margin  could well  engender  problems:  it would  lead  to pressure 
on  prices  in the  Member  State having  the  highest  level and 
would  bring  the  danger  of very heavy  intervention in that 
State;  if  intervention were  confined  to  the  production of  that 
State only,  the  risk of  replacement  of national  products  by 
imported  products  to  supply  the national  market  would  be great. 
However,  the  situation is different assuming  relaxation of  the 
intervention arrangements  for certain products. 
As  the  fundamental  reason  for  the  MCAs  is  the  existence of a 
price guarantee system,  the weaker  that  system  the  less  the 
need  for  the  MCAs;  all depends  on  the nature and  the 
effectiveness of  the  price  guarantee mechanisms  and  on  the 
features of  the market  for  the  products.  More  flexible price 
guarantee mechanisms,  very substantially weakening  their 
impact  on  the markets,  would  thus make  it possible  to 
contemplate an  increase in the neutral margin without  need  to 
fear  the  dangers  mentioned  above.  The  decision with regard  to 
the  size of  the neutral margin  should be  taken on  the basis of 
the  impact which  the  intervention system has  on  the market, 
which  would  mean  increasing now  the neutral margins  for 
certain products  such as beef/veal. 
23.  For  processed  products,  different cases must  be  distinguished: 
(a)  for  processed products  in sectors where  there is rigid 
intervention,  in economic  terms,  it would  seem  that  the 
neutral margins  can be  wider  than  for  the basic products, 
since processing costs account  for a  substantial share of 
overall costs.  This  approach requires an alteration in 
the  rules  for deriving  the  MCAs  for  processed  products; 
(b)  for eggs,  poultry and  albumin,  the  MCA  system at present 
applicable  includes a  special waiver  for  France  and  the 
United  Kingdom. - 17  -
Now,  the  reasons  for  this  waiver constitute a  case for its 
extension  to all the Member  States:  the  products  coming 
under  the  poultry sectors are  (like pigmeat  products) 
regarded as  products derived  from  cereals.  However,  in 
the cost of  the final product,  cereals represent only 
about  an average of  40%.  Accordingly,  in view of  the 
large value added  and  the  lack of  an  intervention system, 
it would  seem  reasonable,  for  products  coming  under 
poultryfarming,  to  reduce  the monetary compensatory 
amounts  through by  increasing  the neutral margin. 
The  Commission  has  in  the  recent past already made 
proposals along  these lines,  which  have  not been accepted 
by  the Council.  A review of  the situation has  not yielded 
any other result.  This  is why,  in an overall,  general 
approach  to  the  problem,  this  idea should now  once  again 
be  considered. 
(c) Under Article 5(5)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85 
(introduced by  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2062/86,  OJ  No  L  176, 
1.7.1986,  p.  15),  for  pigmeat,  the·MCAs  are  fixed  on  the 
basis of  a  price equal  to  30%  of  the basic price. 
However,  for  the Member  States applying positive MCAs  and 
the currencies of  which have  a  narrow margin of 
fluctuation,  it would  seem  that a  waiver applies,  since 
their MCAs,  since 1 July 1986,  have  been equal  to  those 
applicable  on  30  June  1986,  but adapted  on  the basis of 
the prices  valid from  1  July 1986  onwards  subject  to an 
alteration in the agricultural  conversion rates.  The 
recitals of Regulation  (EEC)  No  2062/86  do,  however,  state 
that this  is a  system economically equivalent  to  the 
general  system. 
This  system.as a  whole  will  operate only as  long as  the 
green  ECU  system applies,  that is until  31  October  1987 
(Article 6(1),  third subparagraph,  of Regulation  (EEC) 
No  1677/85). 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  2062/86  makes  clear  the  reasons  which 
have  led  to  the  present situation:  normally,  pigmeat,  like 
poultry products,  is  to.be  regarded as  a  product derived 
from  cereals and  an  identical approach  to both  product 
groups  seems  to  be  a  logical imperative.  However,  this 
approach,  while  corresponding  to  the  fundamental  idea of 
the market  organization for  the relevant  product group, 
had  engendered,  because of  its inherent rigidity, 
substantial  problems. - 18  -
It had  proved  impossible to dismantle  the  MCAs  for  pigmeat 
without altering those for cereals;  but a  change  in the 
green rate for cereals would  have  had  an undesirable 
impact  on  prices and output.  For this reason,  a 
calculation of  the specific MCAs,  based on  a  percentage of 
the basic price,  seemed  to have  advantages  for a  specific 
demobilization of  the monetary gap.  This  was  the method 
of  calculation applied until  1984,  but which  was  based on 
a  relatively high percentage of  the basic price  (70,2%). 
But  experience  gained  since 1984  had  shown  that  the  low 
MCAs  did not entail disturbance of  trade.  In the  interest 
of  freedom  of trade, it still seems  desirable  to  keep 
these amounts  as  low  as  possible,  and,  for  this  reason, 
the authorities  took,  for  the calculation,  only  the 
percentage of  the  basic  price reflecting the  share of  the 
cost  represented by  cereals for  the  production of  a  pig 
carcase.  This  approach would  seem  to be  still the  right 
one  and  the arrangement  can  therefore be  retained as it 
..  is.  However,  for  the  sake of  simplification and 
harmonization,  the  calculation methods  should be  confined 
to  a  single formula,  that of  the  percentage of  the basic 
price. 
(d) For products  not  coming  under Annex  II of  the  Treaty,  the 
MCA  system now  applicable provides  for a  minimum  threshold 
of  the  incidence of  the  MCAs  in terms  of  the value of  the 
products  concerned.  Recent  problems  in implementing  this 
system mean  that it must  be  reviewed. 
The  price of  merchandise  coming  under  Regulation  (EEC) 
No  3033/80  is determined not only by  the value of  the 
basic agricultural products but also,  to a  considerable 
extent,  by  processing and  marketing costs.  It follows 
that  the economic  importance of  the  MCA  in the final  price 
of  these products  is considerably weakened.  For  this 
reason,  and  for  the sake  of administrative simplification, 
a  special system has  been  introduced  (Article 5  of 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  3153/85,  OJ  No  L  310,  21.11.1985, 
p.  4) stipulating that MCAs  are not applied where: 
- the  incidence of  the  highest  MCA  on  the value of  the 
merchandise  concerned .is  less  than  2,5%, 
- the  countervalue of  the  MCA  falls  short of  1  ECU  per 
100  kg  of  merchandise. - 19  ...: 
The  incidence must  be  calculated every six months,  in June 
and  in December. 
Also,  for  the calculation of  the  MCAs  for  this 
merchandise,  the  MCAs  calculated for  the basic products 
concerned are  reduced by  a  flat  10%. 
Experience suggests  that  the  rule that MCAs  are not 
applied where  their incidence  in the value of  the  products 
is not more  than  2,5%  has  not  interfered with trade.  From 
the economic  point of view, .the present system has 
therefore achieved its objective.  However,  half-yearly 
reviews  have  engendered certain difficulties,  including: 
Because  the  exceeding of  the  threshold is determined 
only on  the basis of  changes  in a  single currency,  there 
is the  risk of alteration of  the other MCAs  although 
currency exchange  relations  have  not  changed.  Also, 
because  the activation of  the  threshold is determined  by 
a  single currency having  MCAs,  a  feature  of  the  system 
is its great  instability with  regard  to  the application 
or  the non-application of  the MCAs.  Finally,  such an 
alteration of  the  MCAs  can be  triggered by a  Member 
State for  which  the economic  importance  of  the  trade in 
these  products  is very small.  The  major  disadvantage of 
the  present principle is  therefore  that it introduces  a 
system of neutral margins  rising and  falling sharply and 
quite  frequently. 
Article 5(2)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3153/85  allows of 
review  in  the  interval  between  two  normal  half-yearly 
reviews  in "exceptional cases",  without defining such 
cases.  The  lack of  a  clear definition  led  to  problems 
of  interpretation on  the  occasion of  the  sharp  increase 
in the  Greek  MCAs  in the  second half of  1985. 
It is hard  to  see  how  the  present criteria can be  made  more 
explicit with a  view  to solving  the  problems  mentioned above: 
an objective criterion, generally applicable  to  provide a 
response  to  the first  problem,  is practically inexistent, 
since  the various  products  coming  under  Regulation  (EEC) 
No  3033/80 differ in economic  importance  from  country to 
country. - 20-
The  same  difficulty,  namely  the definition of  the economic 
importance of a  given situation, arises in any effort to 
determine  "exceptional cases".  It follows  that a  solution for 
the  problems  mentioned would  require  replacement of  the 
present  system by  a  system laying down  more  objective and more 
specific criteria. 
Instead of  the old system, it would  be  appropriate  to  take  the 
principle of  an appreciable  increase  in the neutral margin for 
this class of  product.  Such  a  solution is also fairly closely 
in line with  the arrangements  implemented  so  far. 
24.  The  above  considerations  suggest  that it would  be  right: 
to contemplate  in general  a  widening of  the neutral  margins 
on  the basis of  the market situation,  the rigidity of 
intervention rules and  the extent of  processing of  the 
relevant products.  The  possibility available  to  the 
Commission  to choose  the  rate of  the neutral margin  up  to a 
maximum,  and  in particular to act where  purely speculative 
movements  of merchandise entailing massive  intervention were 
discovered,  would  restore  to the MCA  mechanism  its role as a 
safeguard clause  to be  applied only in cases  of  serious 
danger of  interference with  the mechanisms  of  the  common 
agricultural policy.  Also,  the application of  the MCAs 
beyond  the neutral margin would  provide  the necessary 
certainty in cases of  unduly wide  monetary  gaps; 
- to generalize and  make  definitive,  for  pigmeat,  the  system 
of calculation based on  35%  of  the basic price. 
25.  However,  widening  the neutral margins  would  raise another 
question which already is posed at the  present  time  for wine, 
and  under  the special system for  France  and  the  United  Kingdom 
for poultry products. 
In  trade with non-member  countries,  the  levies  and  the 
refunds,  and  in intra-Community  trade,  the accession 
compensatory amounts,  fixed  in ECU,  attract a  "monetary 
coefficient".  This coefficient is derived from  the  percentage 
used  in the calculation of  the MCAs  and  is fixed  by  the 
Commission  together with  the  MCAs  (Article  6  of Regulation 
(EEC)  No  3153/85). - 21  -
So  far,  it has  been considered  that  this coefficient is a 
component  of  the  MCA  applicable  in trade with  the  new  Member 
States and  with non-member  countries.  For  this  reason,  it is 
only another expression of  the  applied monetary  gap  (except 
for  France and  the United  Kingdom  for poultry,  where, 
following  agreement  in the Council,  another arrangement  has 
been  temporarily applied). 
However,  the coefficient can also be  justified by  an economic 
approach according  to which  levy and  refund and  ACA  offset  the 
difference between  the  real values of  the world market  price 
or of  the markets  of  the  joining Member  States,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  of  the  common  price,  on  the other;  consequently, 
they must  also be  converted into national  currency on  the 
basis  of  the  real value of  the  currency of  the  Member  State 
applying  them,  any corrections vis-a-vis  the  levels of  the 
national prices  determined by  the green rates being effected 
by  the MCAs.  The  effect of  this  reasoning is  to base,  from 
now  on,  the monetary coefficient on  the  real monetary gap 
(within the  meaning of Article 5  of  Regulation  (EEC) 
No  1677/85)  instead of  the applied monetary gap  (= real 
monetary  gap  minus  the neutral margin). 
This  new  approach  is all the more  necessary  the wider  the 
neutral margin,  as  the  economic  effect of  the  problem is 
identical  with .that of  the neutral margin,  expressed as  a 
percentage,  on  the  levy,  refund or ACA.  It is in the  logic of 
this  approach  that  the  monetary coefficient be applied also in 
the  case  in which  an  MCA  for  the  relevant  product  does  not 
exist, while,  in the  present arrangement,  without  MCA,  there 
is no  monetary coefficient.  The  consequence of  the new 
concept  would  be  the  identity in all the Member  States of  the 
real  value of  the  charge on  import  and  of  the  refund  on 
export,  e.g.  for non-Annex  II products  for which  the  threshold 
of application was  not  reached. 
V.  CONVERSION  RATES 
1.  Products not  subject  to monetary  compensation 
26.  With  the  above  conclusion,  the  present  review  reaches  the  question 
of  the  conversion rates.  The  application of  the monetary 
coefficients  (with or without  the neutral margins)  amounts  in 
effect  to  applying a  conversion  rate other than  the  green rate. - 22  -
This  is still a  rate closer to  the  real value of  the agricultural 
unit of account  (green  ECU);  where  the  monetary coefficient no 
longer contains  the  incidence of  the neutral margin,  it has  the 
effect of making  the conversion rate coincide with real economic 
circumstances  (which  correspond  to  the central rate in the 
conventional  MCA  system and  to  the  green central rate in the  green 
ECU  system). 
The  same  approach can be  adopted  in respect of  product groups not 
subject  to monetary  compensation.  Although  the products  under  the 
compensation system account  for  the bulk of agricultural 
production,  the number  of  "uncompensated"  sectors is greater  than 
that of  the  "compensated"  sectors.  Now,  these sectors have not 
been brought under a  compensation system since their market 
organization arrangements  do  not  include strict intervention. 
Consequently,  the  price differences  resulting from  the green rates 
do  not  require offsetting, as  there is no  danger  of  disturbance of 
the market. 
But,  in these  conditions,  the  converse  reasoning  must  also be 
correct:  identity of  the amounts  converted  into national. 
currencies should not disturb  the  market. 
27.  One  can  therefore apply in trade*,  for all the  product  groups  for 
which  there are no  MCAs,  a  green rate corresponding  to real 
economic  circumstances.  If it were  necessary  to maintain 
different prices  (or aids)  in national currencies,  this objective 
could be  achieved by  using  the green rate as  such for prices  and 
intervention measures,  but applying  the monetary coefficient to it 
only for  trade;  through  this method,  since  the  green rate is 
reduced  to  the  level of  the  real value of  a  currency,  the  level of 
import  charges/export subsidies/ACAs will be  identical  in all the 
Member  States.  As  compared  with  the  present  system,  this solution 
entails for  the  Member  States with a  positive monetary  gap  a 
reduction,  and  for  the Member  States with a  negative monetary  gap, 
an  increase,  in the relevant amounts  in national  currency.  This 
consequence  should  have  very little effect on  price  levels,  since, 
at the present  time,  the  price differences are not  compensated 
either,  and  still there is no  disturbance. 
(*)  Mainly  trade with non-member  countries,  attracting levies and  refunds 
expressed in  ECU.  To  a  lesser extent,  intra-Community  trade with  the  new 
Member  States is concerned,  in so far as  amounts  expressed  in  ECU  apply 
(accession compensatory  amounts  (ACAs),  and,  in relations with Portugal 
during  the first stage,  comparable  systems). -· 23  -
Also,  already at the  presGnt  time,  a  partial solution is used  for 
certain product groups,  with  the use,  for  trade with non-member 
countries,  of  conversion rates which are more  realistic than  the 
green rate.  The  most  recent  case  :i.s  that of  rice,  for which, 
because of  trade deflection,  the  import  charges  and  the export 
refunds are  converted on  the  basis  of  the  "real" rates  (but 
stabilized for a  short period).  For other product groups, 
comparable  systems  exist, e.g.  for  imported  dried grapes  and 
liqueur wines. 
With  a  view to  the gradual  reversion  to an  economically consistent 
system,  the extension of  this practice  to other product groups  is 
desirable.  Thus,  monetary gaps ·for the m::dntenance  of  which  there 
is no  economic  need  can be  eliminated.  It would  be  wise,  however, 
to  proceed with prudence,  product  group  by  prouct  group,  allowing 
for particular circumstances  and  the  special conditions  for each 
sector.  The  operation should be  completed at the  same  time as  the 
MCAs  disappear for  good:  in 1992. 
28.  An  extension  to  oth~£.~~-tems (intervention systems  in particular, 
which,  in  the  relevant sectors, are generally confined  to  the 
granting of aids)  seems  feasible.  The  difficulty arising is that 
of  a  possible  reduction in national currencies  in. those Member 
States having  positive monetary  gaps.  However,  questions  must 
arise as  to  the  economic  scope  of  such a  reduction if, so  far, it 
has  been  considered  that  the  existing gaps  did not  require 
compensation. 
2.  Products  subject  to  monetary  compensation 
29.  For  products  subject  to  MCAs  or differential amounts,  the approach 
cannot  be  fundamentally different.  However,  in  view of  their 
greater economic  sensitivity,  the  alignment  towards  real  economic 
conditions  should  be  carried out with greater care,  having  due 
regard  to  the situation with  regard  to  production,  farm  incomes 
and  the  development  of  the  economic  and  monetary situation in the 
Community. 
To  establish proper discipline  in this area,  certain compulsory 
rules  could  be  laid down,  especially for  the  period beginning with 
the  1990/91  marketing year.  Already in the  past,  the  Commission 
has  made  a  number  of  proposals,  none  of  which  has  succeeded  in  the 
Council  : 
- in 1976,  a  proposal  to pass  on  to  the green  rates  the actual 
changes  in a currency during an  18-month  reference period  (the 
green rates would  have  had  to  be  fixed at  the  level of  the 
average  of  the  market  rates for  the  reference  period), - 24  -
- in 1977,  a  proposal  for  the automatic  dismantlement over seven 
years of  existing MCAs  and  an annual  dismantlement of  the new 
MCAs, 
- in 1979,  a  proposal  for a  reduction over  two  years  of  the new 
MCAs  and a  reduction of  the existing MCAs  according  to a  more 
pragmatic  procedure  under  the  price review arrangements, 
- in 1983,  a  proposal  for a  two-stage  reduction in the existing 
MCAs  and  a  three-stage reduction in new  MCAs. 
In all these cases,  the main  source of opposition to these 
proposals  was  the fact  that prices are adapted automatically, 
especially where  this meant  price  reductions.  However,  in any  MCA 
system,  rules for  the elimination of  the  MCAs  are  indispensable, 
if there is to be any prospect of  reverting  to a  system without 
such amounts.  Accordingly,  the  Commission  is submitting a 
proposal  for  the negative  MCAs  created by  the  "switch-over";  it 
may  also,  as appropriate,  submit a  proposal  for  the elimination of 
the other MCAs,  in particular those resulting  from  changes  in 
market  .. rates. 
3.  Entry  into force of  the green rates 
30.  Pending  the adoption of  regulations  on  the  fixing of  the green 
rates,  certain principles should be  complied with at once.  The 
main  concern  is with  two  factors  which,  in the more  recent 
legislation,  have  been increasingly neglected: 
- in a  given Member  State  there should only be  one  green rate for 
all the  product  groups;  differing  times  of entry into force at 
the beginning of  the various marketing years are not 
objectionable.  The  present situation,  under which practically 
every product  group of  any  size has  its own  green rate,  is 
unsound.  It abandons  the  price hierarchy  (the only factor which 
is still a  Community  factor  in a  system of  differing prices 
because of  the  green rates), it creates distortions between  the 
product  groups,  and  it helps  to  favour  the  renationalization of 
the  CAP; 
- a  new  green rate should enter into force,  normally,  at the 
beginning of  the marketing year,  exceptionally during  the 
marketing year,  but  then simultaneously for all product  groups. 
However,  flexibility could be  allowed  in certain cases,  for 
example  where  a  currency adjustment occurs after prices have 
been set and  after the marketing year for certain products  has 
started.  In this case,  it should be possible  to apply  the new 
rate  immediately for  the products  for which  the marketing year 
has  already begun  and  at  the  beginning of  the next marketing 
year  for  the others.  Also,  if the decision is taken in the 
autumn,  at a  time at which  the marketing year has  already begun 
for  most  products,  it should be  possible  to  provide  for entry 
into  force  on  the date of  the beginning of  the marketing year 
immediately  following  the decision,  to avoid delays  in entry 
into  force  exceeding  one  year.  Lastly, it should be  possible  to 
take  account  of exceptional situations which are duly justified. - 25  -
VI~  CONCLUSION 
31.  The  agri-monetary system,  while heavily dependent  on  "monetary 
·events",  is essentially an agricultural  system.  Over  the years,  it 
has  undergone  changes  which,  even if the  fundamental  features  have 
remained  the  same,  have  increasingly robbed it of all transparency. 
To  accommodate  particular requirements,  solutions  have  been agreed 
following  divergent,  and  sometimes  conflicting, guidelines. 
The  agri-monetary  system has  thus  become  a  system of  exceptional 
complexity.  In particular,  the difficulty of  dismantling  the 
positive MCAs  and  the  need  to accommodate  the special needs  of 
certain Member  States have  resulted  in a  system with a  wide  range of 
details,  some  aspects of which are mutually  inconsistent.  The  use of 
the  green  rates  to determine national  prices has  introduced a  factor 
of  renationalization and  an element  of  the arbitrary. 
Thus  the  time  is now  ripe  for  a  review of  principles.  This  must 
allow for  the Community's  political objectives,  in particular the 
completion of  the  internal market  and  economic  and  social cohesion. 
The  conclusions  to be  drawn are  the  following: 
(a)  The  Community  must  revert  to  an agri-monetary system which is 
consistenti with  the  general  monetary  system.  This  objective 
cannot  be  achieved  immediately,  and  work  towards  it should be  by 
stages: 
- retention of  the  green  ECU  system,  which  has  operated 
satisfactorily;  but  compliance with a  system for  the 
dismantlement  of  the  negative  MCAs  created by a  "switch-over", 
and  with a  corresponding  system for  prices; 
- abandonment  of  the  principle of  specific green  rates,  diverging 
from  real  economic  circumstances,  in 1992;  elimination,  on  that 
date,  of  the  MCAs  and  of  the differential amounts. 
(b)  In  the  meanwhile,  the existing provisions  can be  amended,  in 
order  to  improve  the  operation of  the  scheme  or  to  limit 
undesirable  consequences: - 26  -
introduction of a  wider maximum  neutral margin  than  the present 
neutral margins  within which  the Commission  would  fix the  level 
applicable by  product  group,  according  to certain criteria  1 
(market situation,  rigidity of  the  intervention system,  degree 
of processing).  The  neutral margin would  no  longer be  referred 
to for  the calculation of  the monetary coefficient, 
for  pigmeat,  maintenance of  the calculation of  the  MCAs  based 
on  a  percentage of  the basic price. 
(c) A system of differential amounts  with a  "neutral margin" will be 
introduced  for  peas  and  field beans.and sweet  lupins. 
(d)  As  regards  the agricultural conversion rates: 
- arrangements  for  the adaptation of  the green rates will be 
established for  products attracting MCAs, 
for· products not attracting MCAs,  ·more  rapid reversion to more 
realistic rates, at least in trade,  seems  feasible. 
All  these  factors are intended  to bring  the  system closer to economic 
reality,  to eliminate some  inconsistencies,  and,  at least as  time 
goes  on,  make  it more  transparent.  Total  abandonment  of  the  present 
system and  reversion to  the original concept of  the  CAP,  under which 
currency exchange adjustments  must  impact  on  agriculture as  on  the 
industrial sectors, will admittedly engender difficulties.  These  can 
be  the most  easily overcome  through even greater convergence of  the 
economies  of  the Member  States and  the  creation of a  European 
currency. - 27  - ANNEX  1· 
APPLICATION  OF  THE  SWITCH-OVER  SYSTEM  FOR  1984/85  TO  1986/87 
I.  CORRECTING  FACTOR 
1.  Principles 
(a) Definition 
The  technical  consequence of  the decision of  March  1984  to 
introduce  a  system for calculating the  MCAs  which avoids  creating 
positive  MCAs  is  that  the  ECU  applied within  the  agri-monetary 
system is linked  to  the  strongest currency.  Consequently,  in the 
event  of  a  currency realignment,  the  revaluation of  the strongest 
currency must  be  reflected in  the  value  of  the  ECU,  so  that it is 
revalued by  the  same  percentage.  The  correcting factor  is thus  he 
expression,  in  the  form  of  a  coefficient,  of  the  percentage 
revaluation of  the  strongest currency against  the  real  ECU.  Since 
the  ECU  is a  "basket" currency and  is, as it were,  defined,  for 
agricultural  purposes,  by  the  central rates of  the  member 
currencies,  the  revaluation of  the  green  ECU  is expressed by  the 
corresponding devaluation of  these  central rates,  to which  the 
correcting factor  is applied.  Since  this operation is confined  to 
agriculture, it has  become  known  as  the  creation of  a  "green  ECU" 
and  of  "green central  rates". 
(b)  Effects 
Since,  through  the application of  the  correcting factor,  the  ECU  is 
revalued,  and since prices are  defined in ECU,  the  introduction of 
this factor  and  its increase as  a  result  of  subsequent  currency 
realignments  have  effectively increased  the  common  level  of 
agricultural prices. 
This  is,  incidentally,  the  reason  why  the  green  ECU  applies not 
only  to  those agricultural products attracting  the  MCAs  but  to all 
agricultural  products.  The  increase  does  not affect prices 
expressed  in national  currency,  the  level of  which  continues  to be 
determined  by  unchanged  green rates.  However,  since  the  gap 
between  price levels  in  two  Member  States  is divided  into  positive 
and  negative  MCAs  by  the  common  price,  which  represents  the 
demarcation  line,  any  change  in this price is initially expressed 
by  a  reduction in  the  positive  MCAs  and  a  corresponding  increase  in 
the negative  MCAs. - 28  -
This also entails adjusting the  levies and  refunds  in line with  the 
revaluation of  the green  ECU  (see attached figure):  when 
calculating  the  levies and  refunds,  the rate  to be  used  for 
converting world  market data  into  ECU  is multiplied by  (the 
reciprocal of)  the  correcting factor,  thus  increasing  the 
difference between  the  common  price and  the world  market  price. 
The  impact of  the alteration of  the  correcting factor  on  the  common 
price in relation to  the world market  price - i.e.  on  the  levies 
and  refunds  - depends  on  the  revaluation of  the green  ECU  in 
relation to  the currencies  in which market  prices are expressed. 
There are several possibilities in this  connection.  Assuming  the 
market  price is expressed in US  dollars, 
- the dollar may  appreciate by  the  same  percentage as  the  green 
ECU,·  in .which  case  the  levies/refunds  remain unaltered; 
the dollar may  remain  unchanged,  in which  case  the  increase  in 
the correcting factor  is reflected in the  increase in levies and 
refunds •.  However,  a  discretionary margin is,  in any  case, 
available  to  the Commission  for  purposes  of  fixing  refunds; 
- the dollar may  appreciate by  a  percentage greater or lower  than 
the  revaluation of  the  ECU,  in which  case both levies and  refunds 
(allowing  for  the discretionary margin for  regunds)  are 
respectively reduced or increased. 
Allowance  for  the real  change  in value  of  the dollar is made 
automatically:  world  market  prices are  converted into  ECU  using  the 
real rate for  the  ECU  times  the correcting factor.  The  possibility 
of  a  divergent shift in the value of  the dollar  in relation to  the 
various  Community  currencies  is  thus  allowed for. 
2.  lmplementation 
(a) Creation 
In March  1984,  the Council decided  to dismantle  by  three points  the 
positive MCAs,  converting  them  to negative  MCAs.  This  decision 
meant  altering one  of  the bases of  calculation of  the  MCAs:  the 
ECU.  The  latter had  to be  revalued  - for agricultural  purposes 
only - so as  to  reduce  the monetary  gap for  currencies with 
positive MCAs  and  to  increase  the  monetary  gap  for  currencies  with 
negative  MCAs. - 29  -
The  new  "green central rate" for  the DM- for which:the  phase-point 
dismantlement  had  been decided  - was  calculated according  to  the 
following  formula: 
real monetary gap = (1  - central  rate)  100 
(  green rate  ) 
at 1  ECU  = DM  2,31728.  The  green central rate for  the  DM  was 
devalued by  3,3651%  in relation to its real central rate. 
Consequently,  the central  rates  for all  the other currencies  had  to 
be  devalued  by  the  same  percentage,  by  applying  to  them  a 
correcting factor of  1,033651. 
Since  the  purpose  of  the  system is  to avoid creating positive MCAs, 
the  green central  rate for  the  DM  will  remain unaltered as  long as 
this currency is  the  strongest. 
Since  the  MCAs  for currencies with variable MCAs  are calculated on 
the basis of  the central  rates for  currencies  complying with narrow 
fluctuation margins,  the  correcting factor is implicitly applied  in 
the calculation of  their MCAs.  It should be noted  that  these 
currencies  cannot,  even if one  of  them  were  the  most  revalued 
currency,  be  used as  the basis  for  the  correcting factor 
(Article 6(3)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1677/85),  since  this would 
result in variable  MCAs  for all Member  States,  which  is considered 
undesirable. 
Details  of  the  impact  which  the  creation of  the  correcting factor 
has  had  on  the  MCAs  are given  in Table  I.  The  conversion into 
negative  MCAs  of  three  positive MCA  points  for  Germany  at the start 
of  the  1984/85  marketing year  led  to  the  creation of negative  MCAs 
ranging  from  3,3 points  (Denmark)  to  3,8 points  (Greece),  the 
different effects being accounted  for  by  the originally different 
monetary  gaps  for  the  countries  concerned. 
In each sector of agriculture,  the amounts  referring  to  the world 
market  (world market  prices,  levies,  refunds,  reference prices) 
were adjusted according  to  the  revaluation of  the  green  ECU,  i.e. 
allowing  for  the  increase  in Community  prices resulting from  the 
introduction of  the  correcting factor.  In certain sectors,  the 
MCAs,  levies and  refunds  fixed  in advance  were also adjusted as 
required. 
Because  the  new  system  took effect at the start of  the  1984/85 
marketing year and  therefore at dates which differed  from  one 
product  group  to another,  the  transition from  the old system of 
calculating MCAs  to  the switch-over system created problems  for 
certain products,  which were  resolved by  transitional measures 
adopted  under Article  7  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  855/84. - 30  -
In particular,  the application of  the new  system at different dates 
made  it difficult  to adjust and  fix levies  for  processed products 
since  the new  system was  to be applied  to  one  or  two  basic  products 
whereas  the old system of  calculation was  to  remain  in force  for 
the others.  However,  such a  distinction cannot  be  made  when 
calculating  the  levies.  The  same  problem arose as  regards  applying 
the  monetary coefficient  to  the  levies  for  those  products. 
The  blanket solution adopted was,  as  regards  import  charges,  to fix 
special uniform monetary coefficients based  on  the  smallest 
monetary  gap  in  the case of  Member  States whose  currency had  been 
revalued.  For export  refunds  the monetary coefficient was  fixed  in 
respect of  the  relevant basic products. 
(b) Alteration 
The  correcting factor was  altered for  the first  time  on  24  July 
1985  as  a  result of  the devaluation of  the  Italian lira on  20  July, 
which  meant  that  the  highest percentage revaluation was  0,154%  and 
the  correcting factor  was  increased from  1,033651  to  1,035239  (1). 
When  allowance  is made  for  the  impact  of  the devaluation of  the 
lira on  the  MCAs  for  Italy,  the  increase in the  correcting factor 
had  no effect on  the  MCAs  for  that country in excess of  that 
percentage.  The  combined effect of  the  7,7%  devaluation,  the 
impact  of  switch-over and  the  change  in the market  exchange  rate 
for  the lira was  to  increase  the  MCAs  for  Italy by 3,7 points. 
Since  the  revaluation of  the green  ECU  was  the  same  for all  the 
other currencies,  the alteration of  the  correcting factor  had  no 
impact  on  the  MCAs  for  the other Member  States:  there was  no  change 
in the  ratios between  the  monetary  gaps  of  the various currencies, 
always  leaving aside  the  changes  in  the exchange  rates  for  the 
floating currencies  (see  Table V). 
A second  increase  in the  correcting factor was  entailed by  the 
realignment of  6  April  1986.  The  4,679%  revaluation of  the  green 
ECU  led  to an  increase  in  the correcting factor  from  1,035239  to 
1,083682 and  to  the creation of  negative  MCAs  ranging  from  4,6  to 
6,3'points  (see Table VI). 
Although  the  revaluation of  the  green  ECU  was  substantial,  it had 
little impact  on  the, difference between  the  common  price and  the 
world  market  price expressed in green  ECU. 
(1)  In fact,  there was  no  change  in the value of  the  green  ECU  and  the  real 
ECU  was  devalued.  Within  the  agri-monetary system,  the effect on price 
levels  is the  same. - 31  -
This  was  due,  in particular,  to  the fact  that  the dollar had also 
gained  in value,  at least  in  the first  few  days after the 
realignment.  \ 
On  6  August  1986,  there was  a  third alteration of  the  correcting 
factor  as  a  result of  the devaluation of  the  Irish punt  on 
2  August.  This  realignment  was  of  the  same  nature as  the July  1986 
realignment,  i.e.  the  1,304%  revaluation of  the  green  ECU  in 
relation to  the  real  ECU  was  equal  for all currencies other  than 
the  Irish punt.  In other words,  there was  no  change  in the 
monetary  and  agri-monetary relationships between currencies other 
than  the  Irish punt,  leaving aside  changes  in the market  exchange 
rates  for  the  floating  currencies.  The  increase  in  the  correcting 
factor  from  1,083682  to  1,097805 altered the MCAs  for  Ireland by 
1,4 points  (see Table VIII). 
The  correcting factor was  altered for  the  fourth  time  on  15  January 
1987  as  a  result of  the  currency  realignment of  12  January  1987, 
which  involved  the revaluation of  the  DM,  the  HFL  (+  3%)  and  the 
BFR/LFR  (+  2%)  and  the alteration of  the  central  rates  for  sterling 
(- 7,75%)  and  the  drachma  (- 8,71%).  In view of  the  revaluation of 
the  DM  and  the  HFL  in relation to  the  ECU  (2,54%),  the  correcting 
factor  increased  from  1,097805  to  1,125691.  The  impact  on  the 
negative  MCAs  ranged  from  3,0  to  3,2 according  to  product,  which 
meant  that not  only were  existing  MCAs  increased but  that,  in 
certain cases,  MCAs  were  reintroduced,  in particular for all 
products  in Denmark  (- 2,0  for  crop products,  1,5 for all other 
products).  In view  of  the  revaluation of  the  BFR/LFR,  the  negative 
monetary  gaps  normally created for  those  Member  States  remained 
within  the  neutral  margin  so  that  MCAs  were  avoided  (for details 
see Annex  XI ) • 
II.  DISMANTLEMENT  OF  MCAs  AND  IMPACT  ON  PRICES 
1.  The  conversion of  the  3  points  of  positive MCAs  for  Germany  at  the 
start of  the  1984/85 marketing year was  accompanied  by  a  simultaneous 
dismantlement  of  the negative  MCAs  which  had  been created as  a  result 
of  the switch-over.  The  impact  of  this dismantlement  was  an  increase 
of  between  3,4%  and  3,6%  in agricultural prices  in all Member  States 
except  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom.  In  the  case of 
France,  Italy and  Greece,  a  further  dismantlement  was  decided  on  at the 
time  for  the  MCAs  applicable only  to  the  currencies  of  those countries 
(see Table  II).  In  the  case of  the United  Kingdom,  switch-over  reduced 
the  positive MCAs  to  such an extent  that  the  monetary applied gap, 
including  the  "non-cumulation" rule,  became  zero. - 32  -
The  measures  which  entered  into force  on  1  January  1985  should also be 
mentioned although  they are not  connected with  the switch-over  system. 
Some  of  the  MCAs  for  Germany,  5  points  in all, were  dismantled and  the 
loss  of  farm  income  resulting from  the fall  in prices caused by  the 
dismantlement  was  compensated  through  the  German  VAT  scheme.  On  the 
same  date,  the  MCAs  for  the Netherlands were  reduced  by 0,6 points  for 
milk  and milk  products,  by  0,7 points  for  cereals  and  by 0,8 points  for 
other products.  The  loss of  farm  income  in this case  was  offset by 
structural measures  (see  Table  III). 
2.  As  part of  its decisions on agricultural prices  for  1985/86,  the 
Council  later dismantled  the  MCAs  for  France,  Italy and  Greece. 
However,  this dismantlement  did not  relate  to  the  MCAs  created by 
switch-over but either to  the  stock of  MCAs  which existed before  the 
start of  the  1984/85 marketing year  (France)  or  to  the  MCAs  resulting 
from  the  changes  in the  exchange  rates since that date  (Italy, 
Greece).  Details  of  these  decisions are given in Table  IV. 
3.  The  negative  MCAs  created by  the  increase in the correcting factor as a 
result of  the  currency realignment  of  6  April  1986  were  partially 
dismantled  - for  certain countries  - in the  context of  the decisions  on 
agricultural  prices  for  1986/87.  Given  the move  towards  a  rigid policy 
on agricultural prices,  the  dismantlement  was,  in principle,  limited to 
3  points  for  livestock  products  and  1,5 points for  crop products. 
p 
Since,  in  the  case  of  BLEU,  Denmark,  Ireland and  Portugal,  the  MCAs 
created by  the  switch-over  had  been partially offset by an alignment  of 
their own  currencies,  the abovementioned  dismantlement  completely 
cancelled  the monetary gap  for  those  countries  in respect of  livestock 
products:  in the  case  of  crop  products,  however,  the  dismantlement of 
1,5 points left a  small  real monetary  gap.  In  the  case of  the other 
countries,  the dismantlement  of  the  MCAs  by  3  and  2,5  points 
respectively did not  completely eliminate  the  MCAs  created by  the 
switch-over.  They  were,  however,  completely eliminated in the  case of 
Greece  and  Italy,  except  for cereals and  oilseeds  (see Table VII). 
In summary,  the  increase  in the  common  level of agricultural prices, 
made  possible by  the switch-over system as  a  result of  the  realignment 
of  6  April  1986,  has  been only partially realized. - 33  -
4.  The  MCAs  for  Ireland  (1,4 points).created by  the  switch-over due  to  the 
realignment  of  4  August  1986  were  completely dismantled as  from 
22  September  1986.  Moreover,  on  that date,  the  MCAs  created by  the 
devaluation of  the  Irish punt  itself were  partially dismantled  (see 
Table  IX) •. 
5.  The  negative  MCAs  created by  the  currency  realignment  of  12  January 
1987  have  not  yet  been dismantled.  However,  some  measure  of  agreement 
was  reached  on  this subject at the Council  meeting of  19-20 January. 
6.  The  negative  MCAs  created by  the currency  realignment  of  12  January 
have  not yet been dismantled.  However,  at  the  Council  meeting held on 
19-20  January  1987,  there was  a  degree of agreement  on  this question. Situation at outset  Introduction of 
" SWitch over " 
Dismantlement 
marketing year 1984/85 
I 
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6,49211  6,49211 
6,8ffi66  :marketing year 1985/86 
DIAGRAMATIC  PPRESEllT  A TIOll  OF  THE  SWITCH-OVER  AllD 
OF  THE  DISMABTLEMEHT  OF  THE  MCAe 
(ignoring the neutral margins) 
~ 
~-VI-B-2 
MONETARY  ADJUSTMENTS 
DECISION  OF  :  31.3.1984 
(VIPPXE-133) 
TABLE  I 
SUBJECT  :  ALTERATION  OF  THE  METHOD  FOR  CALCULATING  MCAs 
INTRODUCTION  OF  THE  GREEN  ECU  ("SWITCH-OVER") 
ANNEX  1 
ENTRY  INTO  FORCE  :  BEGINNING  OF  THE  1984/85  MARKETING  YEAR 
Previous  situation  :  New  situation  :  Change  in  the monetary 
--------------------------------------:---------------------------------------------------:  gap  as  a  result of 
Central  :  :  :  Green  :  :  :  "switch-over" 
Country  :  rate  :  Sector  Green  :  Monetary  gap  :  central  :  Green  :  Monetary  gap  :-------------------------
rate  :-------------------------:  rate  < 1)  :  rate  :-------------------------:  real  :  applied 
real  :  applied  :  :  :  real  : app 1  ; ed  ( 5)  : 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D  :  2,24184  :  Milk  :  2,54273  :  +  11,833  :  +  10,8 
Cereals  :  2,52875  :  +  11,346  :  +  10,3 
Other  :  2,51457  :  +  10,846  :  +  9,8 
:  :  : 
NL  :  2,52595  :  Milk  :  2,73327  :  +  7,585  :  +  6,6 
Cereals  :  2,72149  :  . +  7.185  :  +  6,2 
Other  :  2,70981  :  +  6,785  :  +  5,8 
:  :  : 
BLEU  :  44,9008  :  All  :  44,9008  :  0,0  :  0 
:  :  :  :  : 
F  :  6,87456  :  :  :  : 
:  Milk  :  6,55400  :  - 4,891  :  - 3,4 
:Pigmeat/Wine:  6, 77297  :  - 1,500  :  0 
Other  :  6,49211  :  - 5,891  :  - 4,4 
:  :  :  :  : 
DK  :  8,14104  :  All  :  8,23400  :  +  1,129  :  +  1. 0 
:  :  :  : 
IRL  :  0. 725690  :  All  :  0,725690  :  0,0  :  0 
:  :  :  : 
UK.  :  0,587080  :  All  :  0,618655  :  +  4,658  :  +  3,7 
:  :  :  : 
I  :  1403,49  :  All  :  1341 ,00  :  - 3,337  :  - 1,8 
:  :  :  : 
GR  :  - :  All  :  77,2479  :  - 13.382  :  - 11,9 
(1)  Green  central  rate= central  rate x  1,033651;  reciprocal  =  0,967445. 
(2)  Reference  period  :  from  7.  3.1984 to  13.  3.1984. 
(3)  Reference  period  :  from  29.  2.1984  to  6.  3.1984. 
(4)  Applying  the  new  non-cumulation  rule. 
:  2,31728  :  :  +  8,866  :  +  7,9  :  . - 2,967  :  - 2,9 
:  :  u  :  +  8,363  :  +  7,4  :  - 2,983  :  - 2,9 
:  :  :  +  7,846  :  +  6,8  :  - 3,000  :  - 3,0 
:  :  N  :  :  :  : 
:  2,61095  :  :  +  4,475  :  +  3,5  :  - 3,110  :  - 3,1 
:  :  c  :  +  4,062  :  +  3,1  :  - 3.123  :  - 3,1 
:  :  :  +  3,648  :  +  2,6  :  - 3,137  :  - 3,2 
:  :  H  :  :  :  : 
:  46,4118  :  :  - 3,365  :  - 1,9  :  +  3,365  :  +  1,9 
:  :  A  :  :  :  : 
:  . 7. 10590  :  :  :  :  : 
:  :  N  :  - 8,421  :  - 6,9  :  +  3,530  :  +  3,5 
:  :  :  - 4,915  :  - 3,4  :  +  3,415  :  +  3,4 
:  :  G  :  - 9,454  :  - 8,0  :  +  3,563  :  +  3,6 
:  :  :  :  :  : 
:  8,41499  :  E  :  - 2.198  :  - 1. 0  :  +  3,327  :  +  2,0 
:  :  :  :  :  : 
:  0,750110  :  D  :  - 3,365  :  - 1, 9  :  +  3,365  :  +  1,9 
:  :  :  :  :  : 
:  0,609652(2):  :  +  1,450  :  0  ( 4)  :  - 3,208  :  ~ 3,7 
:  :  :  :  :  : 
:  1432,30(3)  :  :  - 6,814  :  - 5,3  :  +  3,477  :  +  3,5 
: 
:  90,5281(2)  :  :  - 17. 198  :  - 15,7  :  +  3,816  :  +  3,8 
(5)  The  negative  MCAs  resulting  from  switch-over are  dismantled  immediately  (see Table II),  so that the negative gats  have  only a  theoretical  significance. 
:  v; 
(.,. (VIPPXE-133) 
VI-B-2  ANNEX  1 
TABLE  II 
SUBJECT  :  ALTERATION  OF  GREEN  RATES  (1) 
IN  CONNECTION  WITH  1984/85  PRICE  REVIEW 
MONETARY  ADJUSTMENTS 
DECISION  OF  :  31.3.1984 
ENTRY  INTO  FORCE  :  START  OF  THE  1984/85  MARKETING  YEAR 
,T-~---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:  Green  :  :  :  Monetary  gaps  :  New  situation  :  :  Re.-/De-
:  central  :  :  Green  :  resulting from  :-----------------------------------: Dis- :  val.  of  :  Impact 
Country  :  Central  :  rate  :  Sector  :  rate  :  "switch-over"  :  Green  :  Monetary  gap  :  mantle- :  green  :  on 
rate  :c=1,033651  :  :  : -----------------------:  rate  :-----------------------: ment  :  rate  :  prices 
real  :  appl. ( 5 l  :  :  real  :  applied  :  (points)  :. (%)  :  (%) 
~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:  :  :  :  : 
0  :  2,24184  :  2,31728  :  Hi lk  :  2,54273  :  +  8,866  :  +  7,9 
Cereals  :  2,52875  :  + 8,363  :  +  7,4 
Other  :  2,51457  :  +  7,846  :  + 6,8 
:  :  : 
NL  :  2,52595  :  2,61095  :  Milk  :  2. 73327  :  +  4,475  :  +  3,5  :  : 
Cereals  :  2. 72149  :  + 4,062  :  +  3,1 
Other  :  2,70981  :  +  3,648  :  +  2,6 
:  :  : 
BLEU  :  44,9008  :  46,4118  :  All  :  44,9008  :  - 3,365  :  - 1,9  :  46,4118  :  0 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
F  :  6,87456  :  7,10590  :  Hi lk:  :  6,55400  :  - 8,421  :  - 6,9  :  6,93793  :  - 2,421 
:Pigm./Wine(6)  6, 77297  :  - 4,915  :  . - 3,4  :  7.10590  :  0 
Other  :  6,49211  :  - 9,454  :  - 8,0  :  6,86866.  :  - 3,454 
:  :  :  :  : 
OK  :  8,14104  :  8,41499  :  All  .  :  8,23400  :  - 2. 198  :  - 1. 0  :  8,41499  :  0 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
IRL  :  0,725690  :  0,750110  :  All  :  0. 725690:  - 3,365  :  - 1,9  :  0,750110  :  0 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
UK  :  0,587087  :0,609652(2):  All  :  0,618655:  +  1,450  :  0  (4)  :  :  0 
:  :  :  :  :  :  : 
I  :  1403,49  :  1432,30(3):  All.  :  1341,00  :  - 6,814  :  - 5,3  :  1432,00  :  0 
:  :  :  :  : 
GR  :  - :  90,5281(2):  All  :  77,2479  :  - 17,198  :  - 15,7  :  90,5281  :  0 
(1)  Devaluation of green  rates  as  a  result of switch-over+ dismantlement  of negative  HCAs  F +I+ GR. 
(2)  Reference  period:  from  7.  3.1984  to  13.  3.1984. 
(3)  Reference  period  :  from  29.  2.1984  to  6.  3.1984. 
(4)  Applying  the  new  "non-cumulation•  rule. 
(5)  The  negative  MCAs  stated have  only a  theoretical  significance. 
(6)  Valid  from  1.  9.1984  in  the case of wine. 
"  "  1.11.1984  in  the case  of  pigmeat. 
:  :  :  :  : 
:  :  : 
:  0  :  3,365  :  - 3,255  :  +  3,365 
:  :  :  : 
:  - 1,0  :  6,0  :  - 5,534  :  +  5,858  : 
:  0  :  4,915  :  - 4,685  :  +  4,916  : 
:  - 2,0  :  6,0  :  - 5,482  :  +  5,800 
:  :  :  : 
:  ·o  :  2,198  :  - 2,151  :  +  2.198 
:  :  :  : 
:  0  :  3,365  :  - 3,255  :  +  3,365 
: 
:  0  (4) 
: 
:  0  6,8  - 6,355  +  6,786 
: 
:  0  17.1  - 14,670  +  17,192 
~ 
CS'""'--CURRENCY  ADJUSTMENTS 
DECISION  OF:  31.3.1984 
ENTRY  INTO  FORCE:  1.1.1985 
(PHON2-180) 
TABLE  III 
SUBJECT:  ALTERATION  OF  GREEN  0  AND  NL  RATES 
UNDER  THE  1984/85  PRICE  DECISIONS  (1) 








































































0,587087  :0,609652(2):  All  0,618655  : 
1403,49  1432,30(3)  All 
90,5281(2)  All 
1432,00 
90,5281 
(1)  Dismantlement  accompanied  by  compenstory measures. 
(2.)  Reference  period:  from  7.3.1984 to  13.3. 1984. 





Monetary  gap 
real  applied 
+  8,866  :  +  7,9 
+  8,363  :  +  7,4 
+  7,846  :  +  6,8 
: 
+  4,475  :  +  3,5 
+  4,062  :  +  3.1 
+  3,648  :  +  2,6 
: 
0  :  0 
: 
- 2,421  :  - 1, 0 
: 
0  :  0 
- 3,454  :  - 2,0 
: 
0  :  0 
: 






















Monetary  gap 
real  applied 
+  3,866  :  +  2,9  : 
+  3,363  :  +  2,4  : 
+  2,846  :  +  1,8  : 
:  : 
+  3,875  :  +  2,9  : 
+  3,362  :  +  2,4  : 




5,0  : 
5,0  : 
5,0  : 
: 
0,6  : 
0,7  : 




rate  (%) 
+  5,487 
+  5,456 
+  5,426 
+  0,628 
+  0,730 




















VI-B-2  ANNEX  1 
TABLE  IV 
MONETARY  ADJUSTMENTS 
SUBJECT  :  ALTERATION  OF  GREEN  RATE 
PURSUANT  TO  THE  PRICE  DEC-ISIONS  FOR  1985/86 
Coun-:  Sectors  :  Central  rate  :  Green  :  erev~QU~  ~jtuat~QD  :  Dis- Hew  ~jtuatjgn l!l  :  Devalua-
try  :  :  :  Central  rate  :  Green  rate  :  Mgcetar:x  gal!  :  mantlement  Green  :  Mgcetan:  gal!  :  tion  :  Impact 
real  :  applied  :  (points)  rate  :  real  :  applied  :  % 
:------:-----------:--------------:--------------:-------------:-------------:---------:----------- -----------:------------:---------:----------:----------: 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
0  :  :  2,24184  :  2,31728 
Milk  :  :  :  2,41047  :  +  3,866  :  +  2,9  :  - :  l  no  :  +  3,866  :  +  2,9 
Cereals  :  :  :  2,39792  :  +  3,363  :  +  2,4  :  - :  l  change  :  +  3,363  :  +  2,4 
Other  :  :  :  2,38516  :  +  2,846  :  +  1 ,8  :  - :  )  :  +  2,846  :  +  1. 8  -; 
:  :  :  :  :  :  : 
NL  :  :  2,52595  :  2,61095 
Milk  ;  :  :  2,71620  :  +  3,875  :  +  2,9  :  - :  l  no  :  +  3,875  :  +  2,9 
Cereals  :  :  :  2,70178  :  +  3,362  :  +  2,4  :  - :  )  change  :  +  3,362  :  +  2,4 
Other  :  :  :  2,68749  :  +  2,848  :  +  1,8  :  - :  )  :  +  2,848  :  +  1,8 
:  :  :  :  :  :  : 
BLEU  :  All  :  44,9008  :  46;4118  :  46,4118  :  0,0  :  0  :  - :  no  change  :  0,0  :  0 
Pigmeat/  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
F  :  Wine  :  6,87456  :  7,10590  :  7,10590  :  0,0  :  0  :  - :  no  change  :  0,0  :  0 
Milk  :  :  :  6,93793  :  - 2,421  :  - 1, 0  :  2,421  :  7,10590  :  0,0  :  0  - 2,364 
Other  :  :  :  6,86866  :  - 3,454  :  - 2,0  :  1,954  :  7,00089  :  - ],500  :  0  - 1,889 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
OK  :  All  :  8,14104  :  8;41499  :  8,41499  :  0,0  :  0  :  - :  no  change  :  0,0  ..  0  -
:  :  :  :  :  : 
IRL  :  All  :  0,725690  :  0,750110  :  0, 750110  :  0,0  :  0  :  - :  no  change  :  0,0  :  0 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
UK(1):  All  :  0,585992  :  variable  (2):  0,618655  :  +  2. 520  ( 3) :  +  1 • 0  :  - :  no  change  :  +  3,348  (5):  +  2,3 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
IT  :  All  :  1403,49  :  variable  (2):  1432,00  :  - 3,503  (3):  - 2,3  :  3,503  :  1482,00  :  - 0,248  (5):  0  - 3,374 
:  :  :  ..  :  :  :  :  :  : 
GR(1):  All  :  87,4813  :  variable  (2):  90,5281  :  - 13 • 059  ( 3) :  - 11 •  3  :  13,059  :  102,345  :  - 0,233  (5):  0  - 11,546 
(1)  Theoretical  central  rate. 
(2)  The  green market  rates are  :  1  ECU;  0,603039  UKL;  1  ECU  = 1482,09  LIT;  1  ECU  = 102,345  ORA  (Reference  period  :  from  8  to  14.5.1985). 
(Jl  Reference  period  :  from  8  to  14  Hay  1985. 
(4)  With  effect from:  27.5.1985,  in respect of  the start of the  1985/86 marketing year. 
(5)  Reference .period  :  from  15  to  21  Hay  1985. 
:  : 
+  2,421 
+  1,925 
: 
- : 
+  3,492 
+  13,053 
().:> 
""'<'" VI-B-2 
MONETARY  ADJUSTMENTS 
Decision of  :  20.7.1985 
Entry  into  force  :  22.7.1985 
Central  rate 
(VIPPXE-133) 
TABLE  V 
SUBJECT:  ALTERATION  OF  CENTRAL  RATES  (9th  realignement) 
Devaluation  :  LIT  6,0 % 
ORA  11,54% 
Revaluation  :  OM,  HFL,  FB/L,  DKR,  IRL  :  2,0% 
UKL  7,47% 
:Re/Deva-:  Green  central  rate  :Impact 
:  laution  :  1  ECU  = currency  :on 
ANNEX  1 
Monetary  gap  (8) 
:----------------------------------- against  :---------------------:real  Green 
rate  :---------------------------------------------------: 
:Coun-
:try 
Sectors  Old  :  New  ECU  - % 
:  1  ECU=  :Weight:  1  ECU=  :Weight: 
:  currency  :  %  :  currency  :  % 
Previous  :  New  :monet-
coeffic.  :  coeffic.  :ary 
1,033651  :  1,035239  :gap 
0,967445  :  0,965968 
( 1 ) 
Real  Applied 
:---------------------------------------------------: 
Old  New  :Change  :  Old  :New  :Chan.: 
------:----------:----------:------:----------:------:--------:----------:----------:-------:----------:----------:----------:--------:-------:------:-----















All  : 
2,24184  :  32,0 
2,52595  :  10,1 
44,9008  8,5 
6,87456  :  19,0 
2,23840  :32,12  :  +0, 154  2,31728  :  inchange 
2,52208  :10,15  :  +0,153  2,61096  2,61096 
44,8320  8,59  :  +0,153  :  46,4118  no  change: 
6,86402  :19,09  :  +0,154  7,10590  :  no  change: 




IRL  All 
8,14104  2,7 
0' 725690  1 '2 
0,585992:  15,0 
0,724578:  1,2 
+0' 153 
+0,153  0,750110:  0,750111:  0,0001: 
UK  All  0,555312:15,81  :  +5,5248:  0,578092:  0,578323: 
( 2)  :  ( 3) 
IT  All  1403,60  10,2  1520,60  9,21  -7,702  1502,94 
(2) 
GR  All  87,4813  1 '3  100,719  1,14  :-13,143  :  104,421 
(2) 
(1)  Valid  from  the start of  the  1985/86 marketing year. 
(2)  Green  market  rate:  reference  period  :  10  to  16.7.1985. 
(3)  Green  market  rate:  reference  period  :  22  and  23.7. 1985. 
(4)  Reference  period  :  10  to  16.7. 1985. 
(5)  Reference  period  :  22  and  23.7.1985. 
(6)  Reference  period  :  3  to  9.7.1985. 
(7)  Sectors  :  milk,  wine,  pigmeat. 















































-0,001  :  +2,9 




























-0,038  :  +4,9  :  +5,5  :  0,6 
(6) 
-5,158  :  +3,740 
(5) 
0 
-3,782  :  +1,748  :  -1,0 
(5) 
-3,7  :  3,7 
-2,3:  1,3 
w 
~ .• 
VI-B-2  ANNEX  1 
TABLE  V BI$ 
MONETARY  ADJUSTMENTS 
SUBJECT:  15%  DEVALUATION  OF  THE  MARKET  RATE  FOR  THE  DRACHMA 




Sectors  Central  rate  Green  central  rate 
---------------------------------------:------~------------------
Old  New 
:--------------------:------------------. 
:  1  ECU:;; ·  :Weight:  1  ECU=  :Weight: 









Monetary  gap 
----~-------------------------------------------------: 
Real  Applied 
.---------------------------:--------------------------
Old  New_  Old  New  :Chan-: 
:ge 
-------:----------:-------------:------:-----------:------:-------------:-----------:----------:-------------:-------------:----------:---------:-----
2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  : 
:-------:----------:-------------:------:-----------:------:-------------:-----------:----------:-----~-------:-------------:----------:---------:-----: 
D  :  2,23840  32' 12  :  :  2' 31728 
Milk  u  :  :  :  u  :  2,41047  :  +  3,866  :  u  :  +  2,9  :  u 
Cereals  :  :  :  :  2,39792  :  +  3,363  :  :  +  2,4 
Other  N  :  :  :  N  :  2,38516  :  +  2,846  :  N  :  +  1,8  :  'N 
:  :  :  :  :  :  : 
NL  :  :  2,52208  :  10' 15:  c  :  :  2,61096  :  c  :  :  :  c  :  :  c 
Milk  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,71620  :  +  3,874  :  :  +  2,9 
Cereals  :  :  :  H  :  :  :  H  :  2,70178  :  +  3,361  :  H  :  +  2,4  :  H 
Other  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,68749  :  +  2,848  :  :  +  1,8 
:  A  :  :  :  A  :  :  :  A  :  :  A 
BLEU  :  All  :  44,8320  :  _8,59:,  :  :  46,4118  :  :  46,4118  :  0,0  :  :  0 
:  :  :  ..  N  :  :  :  N  :  :  :  N  :  :  N 
F  :  M/W/P  :  6,86402  :  19,09:  :  :  7' 10590  :  :  7' 10590  :  0,0  :  0 
Other  :  :  :  G  :  :  :  G  :  7,00089:  - 1,500  :  G  :  0  :  G 
:  ..  .  . 
OK  :  All  :  8,12857  :  2,69  E  :  :  8,41501  :  E  :  8,41499  :  0,0  :  E  :  0  :  E  :  : 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
IRL  :  All  :  0 '724578  :  1,2  D  :  :  0,750111  :  D  :  0,750110:  0,0  :  D  :  0  :  D 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
UK  :  Al 1  :  0,555312(1):  15,81  :  :  0,578323(1):  :  0,618655:  - 0,161  (3):+0,163  (5):  0 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
IT  :  All  :  1520,60  ( 1):  9,21  :  :  1558,37  :  :  1482,00  :  - 5,469  (3):  - 5,458  (5):  - 3;7 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
GR  :  All  :  100,719  :  1 '14  :  :  106,210  ( 1 ) :  :  102 '345 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
-------:----------:-------------:------ -----------:------:-------------:-----------:----------:-------------:-------------:----------:---------:  .  .  .  . 







Theoretical  rate. 
Calculated  on  basis 
Reference  period 
Reference  period 
Reference  period  : 
of  the market  rate. 
2  to  8.10.1985. 
14  and  15.10.1985. 
9  to  15.10.1985. 
~-
<::) (VIPPXE-133) 
VI-B-2  TABLE  VI  ANNEX  1 
MONETARY  ADJUSTMENTS 
Decision of 
With  effect  from 
6.4.1986 
7.4.1986 
SUBJECT  :  ALTERATION  OF  CENTRAL  RATES  (lOth  realignement) 
Devaluation:  FE  3%,  1  ster.ling  13.31% 
ORA  26,95  % 
Revaluation  :  DM,  HFL  3  % 
FB/L,  DKR  1 % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~---
;Country  Sector  :  Central  rate  :Re/Deva- Monetary  gap  (8) 
:-------------------:luation 
:  Green  central  rate:  Green 
:  1  ECU  = currency  :  rate  :----------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
Old  New  :against  -------------------:  (1)  Real  :  Applied 
--------- ---------:  ECU  Previous  New  : 
coeffic.  coeffoc.: 
1,035239  1,083682: 
0,965961  0,922780: 
:-------------------------------------------------:--------------------------: 
1  ECU  1  ECU  :  %  Old  New 
= 
currency:  currency: 
Change 
Total  :  Resu1sinq  from 
:"switht- :  Other 
over" 
Old  New  Change 
--·------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:--------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- -------- -------- --------
2  :  3  :  4  :  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
--------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:--------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- -------- -------- --------
:  :  :  :  :  : 
0  :  :  2,23840  :  2,13834:  +  4,679  :  2,31728  :unchanged: 
:Milk  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,41047  :  +  3,866  :  )un- :  - :  - :  - .  :  +  2,9  :  u 
:Cereals  :  :  ;  :  ;  :  2,39792  :  +  3,363  :  )changed:  - :  - :  - :  +  2,4  :  N 
:Other  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,38516  :  +  2,846  :  )  :  - :  - :  - :  +  1,8  :  c 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  H 
NL  :  :  2,52208  :  2,40935  :  +  4,679  :  2,61096  :  2,61097  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  A 
:Milk  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,71620  :  +  3,875  :  +  3,874:  0,001  :  - :  - :  +  2,9  :  N 
:Cereals  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,70178  :  .+  3,367  :  +  3,361  :  - .  :  - :  - :  +  2,4  :  G 
:Other  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,68749  :  +  2,848  :  +  2,847  :  0,001  :  - :  - :  +  1,8  E 
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  D 
BLEU  :All  . : ·44,8320  :  43,6761  :  +  2,647  :  46,4118  :  47,3310  :  4"6,4118  :  0,0  :  - 1,981  :  1,981  :  - 4,559  :  +  2,578  :  0  : 
F  :  :  6,86402  :  6,96280  :  - '1,419  :  7,10590  :  7,54546  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
:Milk  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
:Pigmeat(2:  :  :  :  :  :  7.10590  :  0,0  :  - 6.186  :  - 6,186  :  - 4,747  :  - 1,439  :  0  :  - 4,7 
:Other  :  :  :  :  :  :  7,00089  :  - 1,500  :  - 7,779:  6,779  :  - 4,818  :  - 1,961*:  0  :  - 6,3 
:Wine  ..  :  :  :  :  :  7,10590  :  0,0  :  - 6.186  :  6,186  :  - 4,847  :  - 1,439:  0  :  .- 1. 2 
OK  :All  . :  8,12857  :  i,91896  :  +  2,647  :  8,41501  :  8,58163  :  8,41499  :  0,0  :  - 1,980  :  1,980  :  - 4,559:  +  2,579  :  0  :  0 
IRL  :All  :  0,724578:  0,712956:  +  1,630  :  0,750111:  0,772618:  0,750110:  0,00001  :  - 3,001  :  3,001  :  - 4,605  :  +  1,604:  0  :  - 1,5 
UK  :All  :  0,555312:  0,630317:- 11,900  :  0,668592:  0,671975:  0,618655:  - 8,081  :  - 8,626:  0,545  :  - 4,856  :  +  4,311  :  - 6,6  :  - 6,6 
:  :  :  :  :  ( 3)  :  ( 7)  :  :  ( 3)  :  ( 7)  :.  :  :  :  : 
IT  :All  :  1520,60  :  1496,210:  - 1,630  :  1563,02  :  1600,11  :  1482,00  :  - 5,476  :  - 7,977  :  2,501  :  - 4,827 .;  +  2,326  :  - 4,0  :  - 6,5 
:  :  :  :  :  (4)  :  ( 7)  :  :  (4)  :  (8)  :  :  :  :  : 
GR  :All  :  100,719  :  135,659  :- 25,756  :  142,432  :  145,274  :  102,345  :- 39,229  :- 41,955  :  2,726  :  - 6,345  :  +  3,619  :  - 37,7  :  - 40,5 
(5)  :  ( 7)  :  : 
ESP  :All  :  - :  - :  - :  144,382  :  147,859  :  144,382  : 
(6)  :  ( 7)  :  : 
PT  :Sugar  :  - :  - :  - :  150,355  :  152,456  :  150,355  : 
(6)  :  ( 7)  : 
(1)  Valid  as  from  the start of  the  1985/86 marketing  year. 
(2)  Pigmeat  MCAs  are calculated  on  the  basis of a- 6,3 monetary  gap  (cereals). 
(3)  Green market  rate  :  reference  period  :  26.3  to  1.4.1986. 
: 
( 5)  :  ( 7)  :  :  :  : 
0,0  :  - 2,418  :  2,418  :  - 4,578  :  +  2,160  : 
( 6)  :  (7)  :  :  :  : 
0,0  :  - 1,407  :  1,407  :  - 4,533  :  +  3,126: 
( 7)  :  (7) 
(6)  Reference  period  :  24  and  25.2.1986. 
(7)  Reference  period  :  7  and  8.4.1986. 
: 
0  :  0 
: 
0  :  0 








(4)  Green  market  rate  :  reference  period  :  29.1  to 4.2. 1986.  (9)  Frozen at  zero  by  Management  Committee  decision of .8.4. 1986. 








:  4: 
'  -VI-8-2 
MONETARY  ADJUSTMENTS- DECISION  OF  25.4.1986 
ENTRY  INTO.FORCE:  12.5.1986/START  OF  MARKETING  YEAR* 
:Coun-
:try 






TABLE  VII 
SUBJECT  :  ALTERATION  OF  GREEN  RATES 
PURSUANT  TO  THE  1986/87  PRICE  DECISIONS 
Previous  situation  :Dis- :  New  situation  :  : 
:---------------------------------:mantle-:----------------------------------:Devaluatton: 
Green  rate:  Monetary  gap  :ment  :  Green  rate  Monetary  gap  (7):  % 
:---------------------(points):  -------------------: 
Real  :  Applied  :  :  Real  :Applied: 
























Livestock  products 
Crop  products 
Milk 
·  Pigmeat 
Other  animal  prods.: 
Wine 
Other  crop  prods. 
Livestock  products 
Crop  products 
Livestock  products 
Crop  products 
Pismeat  (6) 
Other  livest.prods.: 
Crop  prod-ucts 
Cereals/Oil seeds 
Other  products 
All  sectors 
Livestock  products 
Crop  products 
Livestock  prods.(9): 


























0,772618  :)  0,750110 
:) 
~.640480(2)  :0,694078(2) 
) 
:  )  0,618655 
) 
1476,55(3)  :1600,11(3) 
+  3,866 
+  3,363 
+  2,846 
+  3,875 
+  3,367 






+  2,9 
+  2,4 
+  1,8 
+  2,9 
+  2,4 
+  1.8 
0  1. 980 
1,0 
- 4,7  3,0 
- 6,3(4) 
6,3  3,0 
1,2  1,5 
- 6,3  1,5 
- 1.  981  :  0  1,980 
1,501 
- 3. 001  :  - 1 • 5 
12. 199 
(2) 










1482,00  :)- 7,904(2):- 6,5(3)  4,0 
5,0 
: 
135,313(2)  146,637(2) 
136,441(3)  147,859(3) 









0  (5)  1,98 
1,0 
0  ( 5)  : ( 1 •  98) 
:  1 ,0 























































































+  1 ,981 
+  0,990 
+  2,907 
+  6,186 
+  2,863 
+  1,433 
+  1,411 
+  1,980 
+  1,493 
+  3,001 
+  1,478 
+  5,720 
+  2,743 
-+  1,348 
+  3,846 
+  4,858 
+  14,000 
+  1,957 
+  0,979 
+  1,947 
+  0,969 
·---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~ 
~ Footnotes  Table  VII 
Regulations  1333/86  and  2063/86. 
111  Altered  as  a  resu1t ot  rounding  figures. 
(2)  Reference  period:  from  16  to  22.4.1986. 
(3)  Reference  period:  from  7 to  8.4.1986. 
(4l  The  MCAs  are calculated  on  the  basis  of  cereals. 
(VIPPXE-133) 
- 2  -
'5)  As  a  result of  suspending  the application of the  MCAs  (until  5.5.1986). 
ANNEX  1 
(6)  The  negative  MCAs  created  as  a  result of  the 6.4.1986 realignment  are  suspended  from  1.5.1986 until  30.6. 1986.  As  from  1.7.1986,  the HCAs  are 
calculated on  the  basis  of  35%  of  the  basic  price.  New  green  rates were  fixed  for  France  and  the United  Kingdom  and  the date on  which  all  changes  in 
the  green  rate were  to take effect was  brought  forward  to  1 July  1986  (Regulations  2062/86  and  2063/86  -OJ  No  L 176/86). 
(7)  The  new  variable  MCAs  are  based  on  the  reference  period  30.4.1986  to 6.5.1986,  allowing  for  the entry  into force  of  the  new  green  rates for those 
sectors  (milk+  beef/veal)  for which  the marketing  year  began  on  12.5.1986. 
(8)  A neutral  margin  of five  points  is applied  to wine. 
(9)  The  MCAs  apply  only to sugar. 
~ (VIPPXE-133) 
VI-B-2  TABLE  VIII  ANNEX  1 
MONETARY  ADJUSTMENTS 
Decision  of  : 
Entry  into force 
2 .8.1986 
4.8.1986 
SUBJECT  :  ALTERATION  OF  CENTRAL  RATES  (11th  realignernent) 
Devaluation  :  1  IRL  :  8  % 
1  UK  :  8,4 % 
ORA  :  2,29 % 
:Country  :  Sector  :  Central  rate  :Re/Deva- :  Green  Central  rate:  Green  :  Monetary  gap  (3) 
:-------------------:luat1on  :  ( 1)  :  rate  :-~--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Old  :  New  :against  :----------------~--=  ( 2)  :  Real  :  Applied 
:---------:---------:the ECU  :  Previous:  New  :  :-------------------------------------------------:--------------------------: 
1  ECU  =  :  1  ECU  =  :  :  coeffic.:  coeffic.:  :  Old  :  New  :  Change  :  Old  :  New  :  Change 
currency:  currency:  :  1,083682:  1,097805:  :  :  : ----------------------------- :  : 
0,922780:  0,910909:  :  :  :  Total  :  Resultjng  fr!2!D  :  :  (3) 
:  "Swithc-:  Other 
over" 
--·--:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---~-----:---------:--------:--------:--------: 
2  :  3  :  4  :  5  :  6  ;  7  :  8  :  9  :  10  :  11  :  12  :  13  :  14 
:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:--------:--------:--------: 
:  :  :  ;  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
D  :Milk  :  2,13834  :  2,11083  :  +  1,304:  2,31728  :  2,31728  :  2,41047  :  +  3,866:  same  :  - :  - :  :  +  2,9  :  same  : 
:Cereals  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,39792  :  +  3,363  :  "  :  - :  - :  :  +  2,4  :  " 
:Other  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,38516  :  +  2,846  : 
M  :  - :  - :  :  +  1,8  ,, 
NL  :Milk  :  2,40935  :  2,37833  :  +  1,304:  2,61097  :  2,61094:  2,71620  :  +  3,894:  ..  :  - :  - :  :  +  2,9 
:Cereals  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,70178  :  +  3,361  :  "  :  - :  - :  :  +  2,4  :  " 
:Other  :  :  :  :  :  :  2,68749  :  +  2,847  :  ..  :  - :  - :  :  +  1,8  : 
M 
BLEU  :Livestock:  43,6761  :  43,1139:  +  1,304:  47,3310  :  47,3307  :  47,3310  :  0,000  :  "  :  - :  - :  :  0  .. 
:prods.  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
:Crop  prod:  :  :  :  :  :  46,8712  :  - 0,981  :  "  :  - :  - :  :  0 
F  :Milk  :  6,96280  :  6,87316  :  +  1~304 :  7,54546  :  7,54539  :·  7,31248  :  - 3,186  :  "  :  - :  - :  :  - 1. 7  :  " 
:Pigmeat  :  :  :  :  :  :  7,54546  :  0,000  :  ..  :  - :  - :  :  0  n 
:Other  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
:Livestock:  :  :  :  :  :  7,20131  :  - 4,779  :  "  :  - :  - :  :  - 3,3  .  " 
:products  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
:Wine  :  :  :  :  ;  :  7,20771  :  - 4,685  :  ..  :  - :  - :  :  0  :  .. 
:Other  :  :  : - :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
:Livestock:  :  :  :  :  :  7,09967  :  - 6,279  :  "  :  - :  - :  :  - 4,8  :  "  :  - : 
:products  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
OK  :Livestock:  7,91896  :  7,81701  :  +  1,304:  8,58163  :  8,58155  :  8,58163  :  0,000  :  ..  :  - :  - :  :  0  "  :prods.  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
:Crop  prod:  :  :  :  :  :  8,54064  :  - 0,480  :  ..  :  - :  - :  :  0  :  ..  :  " 
IRL  :Livest.p.:  0,712956:  0,764976:  - 6,800  :  0,772618:  0,839794:  0,772618:  0,000  :  - 8,695  :  8,695  :  - 1,399  :  7,296  :  0  :  - 7,2  :  7,2 
:Crop  prod:  :  :  :  :  :  0,761200:  - 1,500  :- 10,325  :  8,825  :  - 1,419  :  7,406  ;  0  :  - 8,8  :  8,8 
UK  :Pigmeat  :  0,630317:  0,679256:  - 7,205  :  0,727749:  0,747485:  0,654044:- 11,275  :- 14,295  :  3,020  :  - :  3,020  :  - 9,8  :  - 12,8  :  3,0 
:Other  :  :  :  :  : 
IJ_~  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
:livest.p.:  :  :  :  :  :  0,635626:- 14,499  :- 17,606  :  3.107  :  - :  3,107  :  - 13,0  :  - 16,1  :  3,1 
:Crop  prod:  :  :  :  :  :  0,626994:- 16,075  :- 19,226  :  3,151  :  - :  3,151  :  - 14,6  :  - 17,7  :  3.1 
IT  :Cereals/:  1496,21  :  1476,95  :  +  1,304:  1584,07  :  1588,67  :  1539,00  :  - 2,934:  - 3,234:  0,300  :  - :  0,300  :  - 1 ,4  :  - 1, 7  :  0,3 
:Oilseeds  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 
:Other  :  .  .  .  .  :  1554,00  ;  - 1,941  :  - 2,238  :  0,297  :  - :  0,297  :  0  :  - 1. 0  :  1,0  .•  .  .  . 
GR  :All  sect.:  135,659  :  137,049:  - 1,016:  148,025  :  150,033  :  116,673  :- 27,447  :- 28,602  :  1.155  :  - :  1,155  :  - 25,4:  - 27,1  :  1,7 
ESP  :Livest.p.:  - :  - :  :  148,234  :  149,716  :  147,208  :  - 0,393  :  - 1,712  :  1. 319  :  - :  1. 319  :  0  :  0 
:Crop  prod:  :  :  :  :  :  145,796  :  - 1,365  :  - 2,697  :  1. 332  :  - :  1. 332  :  0  :  - 1,2  1,2 
PORT  :Livest. p. :  - :  - :  :  159,652  :  162,514  :  153,283  :  - :  - :  - :  - :  - :  - :  - -
:Crop  prod:  ;  :  :  :  :  151,812  :  - 5,648:  - 7,061  :  1 ,413  :  - :  1,413  :  - 3,7  :  - 5,6  1,9 
(1)  Floating  currencies:  green market  rates. 
l2)  Green  rates applicable  for  the  1986/87 marketing year. 
(3)  Variable  MCAs,  based  on  the  reference  period  :  23  to  29.7.1986  for  previous  MCSs. 
~ 
'-t: VI-B-2 
MONETARY  ADJUSTMENTS 
Decision  of 




16.  9. 1986 










TABLE  IX 
SUBJECT  :  ALTERATION  OF  GREEN  RATES 
DEVALUATION  OF  GREEN  RATE  FOR  IRELAND 
Previous  situation (1)  :  :  New  situation 
:------------------------------------:  Dismant- :----------------------------------:  Re/De-
Monetary  gap  :  lement  :  Green  Monetary  gap  :  valuation 
Green  :-----------------------:(in points):  rate  ----------------------: 
rate  :  Real  :  Applied  :  :  (2)  Real  :  Applied  :  (as%) 
.  (3) 
ANNEX  1 
Impact 
on  prices 
(as  %) 
:-----:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------: 
D  Milk 
Cereals 
Other 
2.11083  2. 31728  2,41047 
2,39792 
2,38516 
+  3,866 
+  3,363 
+  2,846 
+  2,9 
+  2,4 
+  1,8 
:-----:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------: 
NL  Mi 1  k 
Cereals 
Other 
2,37833  2,61094  2,71620 
2,70178 
2,68749 
+  3,874 
+  3,361 
+  2,847 
+  2,9 
+  2,4 
+  1, 8 
:-----:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------
:  BLEU:  Livestock  prod:  43,1139 
:  Crop  products  : 








F  :  Milk  :  6,87316  :  7,54539  :  7,31248  :  - 3.186  :  - 1, 7 
Pigmeat  :  :  :  7,54546  :  0,000  :  0 
Other live- :  :  :  :  : 
stock  products:  :  :  7,20131  :  - 4,779  :  - 3,3 
Wine  :  :  :  7,20771  :  - 4,685  :  0 
Other  crop  :  :  :  :  : 
products  :  :  :  7,09967  :  - 6,279  :  - 4,8 
----:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------: 
OK  :  Livestk.prods.: 
:  Crop  products  : 







IRL  :  Livestock  prod: 
:  Crop  products  : 
0,764976  :  0,839794  :  0,772618  :  - 8,695 





0,817756  : 
0,782478  : 
- 2,695 
- 7,325 
- 1 ,2  : 
- 5,8  : 
- 5,520 
- 2,719 
+  5,842  : 
+  2,795  : 
:-----:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------: 
UK  :  Pigmeat  :  0,679256  :  0,755378  0,654044  :  - 15,336  :  - 14,0 
Other live- :  :  :  : 
stock  products:  :  0,635626  :  - 18,677  :  - 17.3 
Other  crop  :  :  :  : 
products  :  :  0,626994  :  - 20,311  :  - 19,0 
-----:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------: 
:  IT  :  Cereals/Oilsds:1476,95 
:  Other  products: 
:1588,67  :1539,00 
:1554,00 
- 3,061  - 1. 7 
- 2,066  - 1,0 
:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------. 
:  GR  :  All  sectors  :  137,049  :  151,422  :  116,673  :  - 30,079 
:-EsP- -~i~;;t~~k-~;~d  ---=----~---~-15~~1;9----:------------:----------- :  147,208 
:  145,796 
- 2,305 




- 1, 5 
-----:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------: 
:  PORT:  Livestock  prod: 
:  Crop  products  : 
:  164,252  :  153,283 
:  151,812  - 8,399  - 6,7 
(1)  Green  market  rates  and  monetary  gaps  for floating  currencies are  based  on  the  reference  period  10  to  16  September  1986. 
12)  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2897/86;  OJ  No  L 269/86. 
13)  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2896/86;  OJ  No  L 270/86. 
q VI-B-2 
MONETARY  ADJUSTMENTS 
Decision of 
Entry  into force  for 

















~  :  ALTERATION  OF  GREEN  RATES 
·  .... 
DEVALUATION  OF  GREEN  RATES  FOR  FF,  UKL·,  ORA,  PTA,  ESC 
Previous  situation  (1)  New  situation 
:------------------------------------ Dismantle- ---------------------------------- Re/De-
Monetary  gap  ment  Green  Monetary  gap  valuation 
Green  :----------------------- (in points)  rate  ----------------------




on  prices 
(as  %) 
:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------: 

















NL  Hi lk 
Cereals 
Other 










UEBL:  Livestck.prods:  43,1139 
:  Crop  products  : 







F  Milk 
Pigmeat 
Cattle-!  sheep) 
Eggs  & poultry 
Wine 
Other  crop 
products 
6,87316  7,54539  :  7,31248  - 3,185 
7,54546  0,001 
7,20131  - 4, 778 
7,20131  - 4,778 
7. 20771  - 4,685 
7,09967  - 6,278 
- 1, 7 
0,0 




:  4,78 
:---------------:------------ ------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------
:  OK  :  Livestock  prod:  7,81701 
:  Crop  products  : 







:  IRL  :  Livestock  prod:  0,764976  :  0,839794  :  0,817756  :  - 2,695  - 1. 2 
:  Crop  products  :  :  :  0,782478  :  - 7,325  - 5,8 
:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------: 
UK  :  Pigmeat  :  0,679256 
Beef  /veal 
sheepmeat 
Milk  and  milk 
products 
EggS  &  poultry: 
Crop  products  : 
.  ~--·---------------
IT  Cereals  1476,950 
Wine 
Other  products 
0,654044  - 21,610  - 20.1  0,9  0,654044  - 22,497  - 21,0  0,00  0,00 
0,635626  - 25,134  - 23,6  - 5,2  0,668197  - 19,903  - 18,4  - 4,87  5.12 
0,635626  - - - 0,652575  - - - 2,60  2,67 
0,635626  - ·25,134  - 23,6  0,9  0,635626  - 26,047  - 24,5  0,00  0,00 
0,635626  - 25.134  - 20,9  0,9  0,635626  - 26,047  - 21,8  0,00  0,00 
















:  116,673 
:  116,673 
:  - 39,065 
:  - 39,065 
34,1 
37,6 
1,0  116,673 
- 130,674 
-1,0  116,673 
40,092 
40,092 
35,1  0,00 
- - 10.71 







TABLE  X - part  2  ANNEX  1 












:  Previous  situation  (1)  :  :  New  situation  : 
:-------~-----------------------~----:  Dismantle-:---------------------------------~: Re/De-
Monetary  gap  :  ment  :  Green  Monetary  gap  :  valuation 
Green  :----------------~------:(in points):  rate  ----------------------: 
rate  :  Real  :  Applied  :  :  (2)  Real  :  Applied  :  (as  %) 
(3) 
Impact 
on  prices 
(as %) 
-----:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------: 
ESP  :  Sheepmeat  :  :  :  147,208  :  -·  :  - :  - :  151,806  - 3,03  3. 12 
Other  live-
stock  products  147,208  - 5,390  - 3,9 
Wine  145,796  - 6,411  - 1,4 
Crop  products  145,796  - 6,411  - 4,9 
---:---------------:------------:------------:------------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:-----------:----------:-----------:-----------
PORT:  Crop  products  : 
:  Livestock  prod: 
151,812  :  - 12,758 
153,283 
- 11 ,3 
162,102  - 5,44  5,75 
-~ ~-· --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1)  Green  market  rates  and  monetary  gaps  for  floating  currencies are  based  on  the reference  period  17  to  23  December  1986. 
12)  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3923/86;  OJ  No  L 367/1. 
(3)  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3971/86;  OJ  No  L 369/1. 
FLOATING  CURRENCIES  -Previous monetary  gaps  are those  in force  on  29.12.1986. 
-New monetary  gaps  are  those  in force on  5.1.1987. 
~ 
"""" 
\ CURRENCY  ADJUSTMENTS 
Decision of:  11.1.1987 
Entry  into  force:  12.1.1987 
TABLE  XI 
SUBJECT:  ALTERATION  OF  CENTRAL  RATES  (12th  realignment) 
Revaluation:  DH,  3%;  HFL,  32%;  BFR/LFR,  2% 
Devaluation:  UKi,  7,75%;  ORA,  8,71% 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:Country  Product  Central  rate  :Re/Deva-
group  -------------------:luation 
Former  New  :in terms 
--------- ---------:  of  the 
1  ECU  1  ECU  :  ECU 
;~  ;~ 















Monetary  gap  (3) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
Real  App1ied 
.-------------------------------------------------:---------~----------------: 
Fonner  New  Alteration 
Total  :  Resulting  from 
Switch  :  Other 
over 





2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
:--------:---------:---------:---------:---------:--~------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:--------:--------:--------: 













:Milk  :  2,37833  :  2,31941 
:Cereals 
:Other  : 
:Livestock:  43,1139  :  42,4581 
:products 
:Crop  pr. 








:Crop  pr.  : 
:Lhestock:  7,81701:  7,85206 
:products 
:Crop  pr. 
:Cereals  :  0,764976:  0,768407 
:Other  :  : 
:Pigmeat  :  0,679256:  0,739623 
:Beef 
:Other  : 
:livestock: 
:products  : 
:Crop  pr.  : 
:Cer/Otls.:  1476,95  :  1483,58 
:Wine 
:Other  : 
:Sheepmeat: 
:Other  :  137,049:  150,798 
:Sheepmeat: 
:Other  : 
:Livestock: 
:products  : 
:Crop  pr.  : 
:Livestock: 
:products  : 
:Crop  pr.  : 
+  2,540  :  2,31728  :  2,31728 
+  2,540  :  2,61097  :  2,61094 
+  1,545  :  47,3307  :  47,7947 
- 0,446  :  7,54539  :  7,77175 
0,446  :  8,58155  :  8,83899 
0,447  :  0,839794  0,864989: 
8,162  :  0,802208  0,821768: 
- 0,447  :  1593,85  :  1648,37 
- 9,118  :  164,125  :  167,542 
172,641  :  177.209 
















...  3,866 
+  3,363 
...  2,846 
...  3,894 
...  3,361 









...  0,001 
8,54064  :  - 0,480 
0,782478:  7,325 
0,817756:  - 2,695 
0,654044:- 22,497 









































































































...  2,9 
+  2,4 
...  1. 8 
+  2,9 
+  2,4 
























td.  ..  ..  .. 










































2,9  • 
3,8 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-------------------------------------------------------------------
(I)  Floating currencies:  green market  rates. 
12)  Green  rates applicable for  the  1986/87 marketing year. 
t3l  variable HCAs  based  on  the reference  period  from  31.12.1986 to 6.1.1987. 
* 
""<i 